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Environmental Studies

Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol; NAFTA and WTO Concerns
Director: Ten Broberg

In response to international concern surrounding the effects of global climate
change the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change was drafted in 1998 at the third meeting of the Conference of
Parties (COP-3). The Kyoto Protocol is aimed at reducing greenhouse gas
emissions which cause global warming.
Conflicts may arise between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),
such as the Kyoto Protocol, and international trade agreements, such as the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)/World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Member trade
obligations under GATT/WTO and NAFTA may restrict freedom to participate in
the Kyoto Protocol. Concern arises about the ability of a country that is member
both to the WTO or the NAFTA, as well as to the Kyoto Protocol, to place trade
restrictions on ERUs created in countries that are member to the WTO or the
NAFTA but not party to the Kyoto Protocol. This paper will focus on such
situations, with emphasis on the case of Canada and the United States (U.S.).
The manner in which member obligations under the WTO and/or NAFTA will
affect the success of the emissions trading system under the Kyoto Protocol will
depend largely on how the emission reduction units created by the Kyoto Protocol
are classified under the WTO and the NAFTA. The classification will dictate
which rules apply to trade in emission reduction units, and more importantly,
which exemptions to these rules will apply. This paper will briefly review the
relevant treaties involved, discuss the relationship between MEAs and general
principles of International Law. and then proceed to examine Canada's options
under three possible classification scenarios (goods, services, and non-violation).
This paper will then shift focus to discuss how the NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement may hold the potential to protect Canada’s environmental laws (i.e.
the Kyoto Protocol) from a U.S. challenge under the NAFTA. Lastly, this paper
will touch on some alternative potential trade conflicts which may arise under the
Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading system.
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I. Introduction
In response to international concern surrounding the effects o f global climate
change the Kyoto Protocol’ to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change^ was drafted in 1998 at the third meeting o f the Conference o f Parties (COP-3).
Global warming is caused by the presence, and continued release o f large quantities o f
greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. The Kyoto Protocol is aimed at reducing
emissions o f these gasses.

The Kyoto Protocol requires nations that are party to the treaty to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to approximately 5% below 1990 levels by the year 2012. The
Kyoto Protocol is currently undergoing a continued drafting process with anticipation o f
ratification by 2007. The Protocol will take effect 90 days after at least 55 countries
ratify, and 55% o f 1990 CO 2 (or CO 2 equivalent) emissions are accounted for. In light o f
the negotiations surrounding the ratification o f the Kyoto Protocol, a number o f concerns
are arising surrounding the associated emission reduction credit trading mechanism
contained therein.

Conflicts may arise between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), such
as the Kyoto Protocol, and international trade agreements, such as the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)AVorld Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Member trade obligations under GATT/WTO and

’ Conference o f the P a rties to the F ram ew ork Convention on C lim ate Change: K yo to P rotocol. Decem ber
10, 1997, U .N , D oc. F C C C /C P /1997/L .7/A dd.l, 37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter AiVoro P roloco/].
U nited N ations Conference on the Environm ent an d D evelopm ent: F ram ew ork C onvention on C lim ate
Change, M ay 9, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force March 21, 1994) [hereinafter U N FCCC\.
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NAFTA may restrict freedom to participate in the Kyoto Protocol.

Members to

GATT/WTO and NAFTA are restricted in their ability to place quantitative barriers to
trade (i.e. quotas, sanctions, taxes, etc.) affecting products or services from other member
nations. Additionally, under the Kyoto Protocol, member nations may only use emission
reduction units (ERUs) created in other Kyoto Protocol member nations for the purposes
o f accounting under the Protocol. Concern arises about the ability of a country that is
member both to the WTO or the NAFTA, as well as to the Kyoto Protocol, to place trade
restrictions on ERUs created in countries that are member to the WTO or the NAFTA but
not party to the Kyoto Protocol. This paper will focus on such situations, with emphasis
on the case o f Canada and the United States (U.S.). Canada and the U.S. are both party
to both GATT/WTO and NAFTA. However, because the current President of the United
States, George W. Bush, has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,^ Canada may have
reason to be concerned about the trade implications associated with their own anticipated
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.

The NAFTA and/or the WTO may become a barrier to the best available
multilateral solution to global warming. The fear is that because the economic risk
associated with ratifying the Kyoto Protocol is so great,'* Canada m ay be forced to
abandon the Kyoto Protocol entirely. If these questions are eventually decided by a
NAFTA panel it will have serious implications and ramifications for the future o f market

^ President Bush issued a letter to several senators voicing the rejection. See letter from George W. Bush to
Senator Chuck Hagel, et. al.(March 13, 2001) available at
http;//www. whitehouse. gov/new s/releases/2 0 0 1/0 3 /2 0 0 10314.html
■* Som e authors argue that “no [other] M EA has had the potential to impact so many sectors o f the
econom y, so many econom ic interests and such high volum es o f trade in products ands services.’' See
Jacob Werksman, G reenhouse G as E m issionsTrading an d the If'TO, 8 R eview o f European Com m unity &
International Environmental Law 3:251 (1999)
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based incentives as solutions to global environmental problems, particularly through the
use o f MEAs.

The manner in which member obligations under the WTO and/or NAFTA will
affect the success o f the emissions trading system under the Kyoto Protocol will depend
largely on how the emission reduction units created by the Kyoto Protocol are classified
under the WTO and the NAFTA. The classification will dictate which rules apply to
trade in emission reduction units, and more importantly, which exemptions to these rules
will apply. This paper will briefly review the relevant treaties involved, discuss the
relationship between MEAs and general principles o f International Law, and then
proceed to examine Canada’s options under three possible classification scenarios. The
first scenario will assume that emission reduction units are classified as “goods” under
the WTO, and therefore subject to the requirements o f the GATT and NAFTA rules
pertaining to trade in goods. This section will examine related past conflicts reviewed by
WTO dispute resolution panels, and attempt to reconcile the potential conflict described
above between the NAFTA and/or WTO, and the Kyoto Protocol by exploring the option
o f a Canadian unilateral sanction^ on U.S. created emission reduction units.^ The second
scenario will assume that emission reduction units are classified as “services,” and are
therefore subject to the requirements o f the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) under the WTO and the NAFTA equivalent rules. This section will discuss

^ B ecause the K yoto Protocol does not recognize ER U s created in non-Party nations, i f Canada were to
incorporate the K yoto Protocol into dom estic legislation through a statute, it w ould effectively be placing a
sanction on ER U s created in any non-Party nation. This w ill be discussed in more detail below .
* N ote this paper w ill also discuss the relationship betw een Multilateral Environmental Agreem ents and
their relationship to international trade laws particularly the case o f inconsistencies betw een these two types
o f agreements.
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possible sectors o f classification and compare the GATS and GATT stipulations with
respect to exemptions. The last scenario will present an argument for why emission
reduction credits should not be classified as neither “goods,” nor “services,” therefore
falling outside the jurisdiction o f the WTO and the NAFTA. This paper will then shift
focus to discuss how the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement may hold the potential
to protect Canada’s environmental laws (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol) from a U.S. challenge
under the NAFTA. Lastly, this paper will touch on some alternative potential trade
conflicts which may arise under the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading system.

II. Summary of Relevant Treaties

A. The Kyoto Protocol
1. Overview
The objective o f the Kyoto Protocol is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations^ in the Earth’s atmosphere at levels that will reduce the likelihood o f
adverse effects from climate change.^ Countries that are party to the treaty are divided
into Annex B and non-Annex

parties. Annex B contains 39 members and includes

those parties that were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

’’ The K yoto Protocol does not aim to control the release o f greenhouse gasses covered under the U nited
N ations: P ro to c o l on Substances that D ep lete the O zone L ayer, September 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541
(entered into force January 1, 1989) (hereinafter M ontreal P ro to co l). Greenhouse gasses controlled under
the K yoto Protocol include Carbon D ioxide (CO?) and CO? equivalents. CO? equivalents include M ethane
(CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N ?0), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur
hexafluoride (SF^) [Annex A to K yoto Protocol],
*As defined in UNFCCC note 5 art. 1( 1) “adverse effects o f clim ate change” are defined as “changes in
the physical environment or biota resulting from clim ate change w hich have significant deleterious effects
on the com position, resilience, or productivity o f natural and managed ecosystem s or on the operation o f
socio-econom ic system s or on human health and w elfare.”
^ Aim ex I refers to the Annex I o f the UNFCCC Charter. A nnex B refers to A im ex B o f the Kyoto
Protocol. The difference is slight but significant in som e cases. See w w w .C 0 2 e .c o m for m ore details.
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Development (OECD) in 1992, as well as those countries in Eastern Europe whose
economies were in transition to a market economy at that time. These countries were
deemed to be “developed” in 1992 and subjected to legally binding obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol. Non-Annex B parties include the developing economies of the G-77.'®
As mentioned above, the Kyoto Protocol will come into effect 90 days after fifty-five
parties to the United Nations Federation Convention on Climate Change have ratified the
Protocol. Additionally, those 55 member signatures must account for at least 55% o f the
total Annex B CO 2 emissions for 1990." Considering the emissions data for 1990, two o f
the three largest emitters, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United
States, will likely have to ratify the Kyoto Protocol for it to take effect.’^

2. Emission Reduction and Domestic Policy Requirements

The first commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol will be 2008-2012. During
this time frame the overall goal is to reduce greenhouse g as" emissions from Annex B
countries to 5% below 1990 levels. Eastern European, Annex B countries which are in
transition to a market econom y" will be allowed to use an alternate base year to

For a fiill list o f A nnex B countries see A ppendix A , for explanation o f the additional financial
obligations for N on-A nnex B countries see supra note 1 art. 11.
" su pra 1 art. 25(1)
'■ James T. Bryce, C ontrolling the Tem perature: An A nalysis o f the K yoto P rotocol, 62 Saskatchewan Law
R eview 379 (1999). A s o f September 2002 the European U nion and the Russian Federation have ratified
the K yoto Protocol. Therefore, the Protocol has m et its prerequisite and may. theoretically, enter into
force.
supra note I
T hese countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
R om ania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
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determine emission baselines. Emissions from this base year shall be multiplied by five^^
to determine required emission reduction commitments.

The Kyoto Protocol requires parties to promote “sustainable development”
through incorporation of various domestic policy measures into future planning and
development. These measures include commitments to enhance energy efficiency,
protect and create greenhouse gas s in k s,p ro m o te sustainable agriculture, research and
promote renewable energy and CO 2 sequestration technologies, reduction and phase out
o f market imperfections’’ that run counter to the objectives of the UNFCCC, encourage
policies aimed at greenhouse gas reductions, limit or reduce greenhouse gases emitted by
the transportation sector, and limit or reduce methane emissions through recovery and use
in waste management. The Kyoto Protocol also requires parties to share information with
other members of the UNFCCC with respect to meeting their emission reduction
commitments.

3. Flexibility Mechanisms

The Kyoto Protocol allows for three distinct flexibility mechanisms to assist
Annex B parties in meeting their quantitative emission reduction commitments. The first
of these flexibility mechanisms is joint implementation. ’^ Under this mechanism two

The text o f the Kyoto Protocol does not indicate h ow the number five was determined.
su pra note 2 defines a sink as “any process or activity or m echanism which rem oves a greenhouse
g a s...[fro m the atmosphere]” i.e. oceans and forests
i.e. “fiscal incentives, tax and duty exem ptions, and subsidies on all greenhouse gas em itting sectors that
run counter to the objective” o f the UNFCCC.
supra note 1 art. 4
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Annex B parties may jointly fulfill their commitments through a regional economic
integration organization,'^ such as the European Economic Community (EEC), or by
engaging jointly in projects aimed at reducing emissions. These projects involve one
Annex B party transferring or acquiring emission reduction units (ERUs) created through
these emission reduction activities in the partner country.^*^

The second flexibility mechanism allowed for under the Kyoto Protocol is closely
related to the projects allowed for under joint implementation. This flexibility mechanism
is emissions trading^' between Annex B nations. The premise o f an emissions trading
system is that such a system will create market incentives for parties to reduce emissions
beyond their commitment levels through both domestic policy changes as well as through
technology development. Additionally, an emissions trading system may reduce
compliance costs, and create incentives for new technology development. The Kyoto
Protocol will set a cap, or “assigned amount” to each Party which will dictate their
emission reduction requirements. Annex B parties that reduce their COi, or CO?
equivalent, emissions beyond their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, can sell that
difference to another Annex B party in an open market system. The unit of such an
emission reduction is called an assigned amount unit (AAU). These “projects” must
create reductions in greenhouse gasses that are supplemental to domestic action. The
Kyoto Protocol does not articulate any other significant differences between AAUs

a “regional econom ic integration organization” is defined by UNFCCC st4pra note 2 as “an organization
constituted by sovereign States o f a given region w hich has com petence in respect to matters governed by
this Convention or its protocols and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to
sign, ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the instruments concerned.”
Japan and Russia have already participated in such a “project.” See B ootleggers, Baptists, a n d the
G lo b a l Warming Battle. 26 Harvard Environmental Law R eview 177 at 224.
■' K yoto Protocol Article 17
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created through emissions trading and ERUs created through “projects” other than the
Specification of the method though which the credit was created.

22

Lastly, the Kyoto Protocol allows for a Clean Development Mechanism (COM).
The COM allows for non-Annex B parties^^ to create certified emission reductions
(CERs) fi'om projects which reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These CERs can be used
to offset emissions in Annex B nations in order to help Annex B nations to meet emission
reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM is essentially the same as a
“project” except that it involves an Annex B party acquiring CERs from a non-Annex B
party.

2. Trade Restrictions Embedded in Trading Rules

The Kyoto Protocol itself does not lay out detailed rules surrounding the
implementation of the above mentioned flexibility mechanisms, although the COP is
currently negotiating these details. The Marrakech Accords^"^ outline many o f the rules
with respect to emissions trading. The Kyoto Protocol does specify, however, that Annex
B parties may trade emission reduction units among themselves, and may trade in CERs
with countries not included in Annex B that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol."^ Implicit

" At C 0 P 6 the Parties agreed that ER U s and A A U s are fully fungible (see U N C T A D - Greenhouse Gas
Trading -D R A F T ), therefore the term A A U w ill be used throughout this paper to im ply both ERUs and
A A U s with respect to trading restrictions.
N on-A nnex B parties engaging in C D M transactions must be party to the K yoto Protocol. Supra note 1
The Marrakech A ccords were negotiated at C O P6 in 2000
Supra ! art. 6(1). N ote that som e authors speculate that the K yoto Protocol w ill not prohibit Parties from
selling A A U s to non-Party nations, only that they cannot buy A A U s from non-Party nations. See
Bodansky, Daniel, Linking U.S. a n d In ternational C lim ate Change Strategies, P ew Center on Climate
Change at 4, Baron, Richard and Pershing, Trading G reenhouse G ases O utside K yoto, International
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in this language is that Annex B parties may not trade with any non-parties to meet
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. It is anticipated that the final emissions trading
rules will, as negotiated in the Marrakech Accords, explicitly mirror this restriction.

B. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)^*/ World Trade
Organization (WTO)

1. Overview

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was negotiated by the Conference
o f Parties in 1947. The goal o f this agreement was to encourage economic development
by easing restrictions and liberalizing trade among contracting parties. Central to the
agreement are three core principles; Most Favored Nation, National Treatment, and
Prohibition on Import/Export Restrictions. Article I of the GATT outlines the Most
Favored Nation (MFN) principle. Under the MFN principle each party agrees to accord
unconditional equal treatment to all other member n a tio n s.T h e re fo re , no party may
grant any privilege with respect to any imported product to any other party without giving
those same privileges, with respect to “like products”

to all other GATT/WTO parties.

Article III o f the GATT outlines the national treatment principle which requires that
foreign goods imported to member states be treated in the same manner as “like

Energy A gency, at 2, and Diringer, Elliot, Two Scenarios: Linking U.S. an d International C lim ate Change
Efforts, P ew Center on Global Climate Change, at 3
General Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U .N .T .S. 187 (1947) [hereinafter GATT].
Specifically the text o f the GATT outlining the M FN principle states that:
any advantage, favor, p rivilege, or im m unity, granted by any contracting party to a product
originating in ...a n y other country shall be accorded im m ediately and unconditionally to the like
products originating...in all other contracting parties.

“like products” are not defined in the GATT
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products” produced doinestically. In other words, this provision limits and/or eliminates
economic advantages for domestically produced products over imported products.^^
Lastly, Articles XI and XIII o f the GATT govern the prohibition on import/export
restrictions. Articles XI and XIII prohibit the use o f quantitative “prohibitions or
restrictions,” such as bans, quotas and import licenses, on imports from member
countries.

In 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, and signed by
over 100 member countries at the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Many new
agreements were negotiated as annexes to the WTO. These annexes include multilateral
agreements dealing with trade in goods,^’ services, and intellectual property.^^ These
annexes include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade o f 1994. The GATT 1994
incorporated many but not all o f the provisions o f the GATT 1947. The WTO was
established to “implement and administer the operations, and further the objectives’’^^ o f
the agreements defined therein. Additionally, the WTO must resolve disputes under its
agreements,^"^ and must review all trade policy o f member nations.

S pecifically the text o f GATT outling the national treatment principle states that the imports fi’om any
contracting party:
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that to like products o f national origin in respect to all
laws, regulations, and requirem ents affectin g their internal sale.

GATT Article XI{1) specifically states:
N o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether m ade effective
through quotas, im port, or export licen ses, or other m easures, shall be instituted or m aintained by
any other contracting party on the im portation o f any product o f the territory o f any other contracting
party.

” W TO Com m ittees on Trade and the Environment, Sanitary and Phytosanitary M easures, and Technical
Barriers to Trade.
A s covered by General Agreem ent on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS] and Trade Related aspects o f
Intellectual Property [hereinafter TRIPS]
Ralph Folsom , International Trade a n d Investm ent in a Nutshell, at 67
It is important to note that only the governm ents o f W TO members have standing to request dispute
settlem ent and participate in the adjudicative process. Additionally, W TO dispute settlement panel hearings
and negotiations are done behind closed doors and are not open to the public.
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2. Exceptions to Trade Restriction under the GA TT

Article XX Sections (b) and (g) o f the GATT provide some exceptions to allow
trade restrictions under specific conditions relating to environmental conservation and
protection/^ Article XX provides a legal pathway for trade measures that would
otherwise be in conflict with GATT obligations, to deviate from those obligations. The
following conditions must be met in order for GATT Article XX to apply to a particular
trade restriction:

•

It is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health^^ or;

•

they relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption,^^

Trade measures meeting the above conditions may be exempt from conflicting GATT
obligations as long as they do not constitute:

•

a means o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail; or

•

a disguised restriction on international trade.

Although the word “environment" is never actually used
supra note 2 6 art.XX(b)
su pra note 2 6 art. X X (g)
These requirements are called for in the chapeau to GATT Article X X
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Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, in the event o f conflict, GATTAVTO tribunals
have tended to favor the interests of free trade over those o f environmental protection.

C. The North American Free Trade Agreement^^

1. Overview

Free trade negotiations between the U.S. and Canada dates back to the ElginMarcy Treaty of 1854. The Elgin-Marcy Treaty established free trade between the two
countries for virtually all products as well as opened up access to mutual fisheries. In
1866 the U.S. pulled out of the Elgin-Marcy Treaty and trade negotiations between the
two countries was put on hold for nearly 70 years. President Roosevelt was the first to
resume negotiations, but he was unsuccessful in his attempt to negotiate a free trade
agreement between the two countries."^® The two countries did, however, participate in
the GATT o f 1947. This agreement served as an alternative until the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement"*' went into effect on January 1, 1989. The CFTA both
borrowed from the existing GATT of 1947,"*^ as well as helped lay the groundwork for
the NAFTA.

North American Free Trade Agreem ent, D ec 17, 1992, C an-M ex.-U .S., 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA],
Although Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreem ents Act in 1935, under which tariffs were
substantially reduced betw een U.S.-Canadian trade, Canadian Prime M inister King declined to support the
agreement.
hereinafter CFTA
i.e. CFTA transposed G A T T ’s art. X X exceptions into it's text

12
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The NAFTA, negotiated by President George Bush in the early 1990s, then modified
and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on January 1, 1994, was developed to create
a free trade area between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. It was designed to
integrate the economies o f Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. while keeping the political
barriers firmly in place."^^ The treaty was closely modeled after the GATT/WTO"^'* in its
central goals o f decreasing quantitative restrictions to trade through the decrease and
elimination of trade barriers such as tariffs, taxes, and import licenses. The elimination
o f the risk o f U.S. imposed taxes and tariffs on imported goods was particularly attractive
to Mexico at the time due to their heavy economic reliance on market access to the U.S.
with 75% of their export market going to U.S. consumers."*^

The NAFTA contains several core objectives as defined in Article 102. They include
the following;

•

Reduction and/or elimination o f trade barriers (i.e. sanctions, taxes, tariffs)

•

Creation of conditions o f regional fair competition

•

Increase investment opportunities

•

Protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights

•

Procedures for the implementation and application of the NAFTA, including
methodology for settlement of disputes; and

•

Framework for further regional and multilateral cooperation to enhance the
benefits of the NAFTA

see Ralph Folsom , NAFTA in a Nutshell, W est Law 1999
** see Table I below
supra note 41
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Immediately following the implementation o f the NAFTA in 1994, trade and foreign
investment between the three countries increased dramatically. The economic boost is
particularly evident in the case o f trade between the U.S. and Mexico. U.S. exports to
Mexico increased by 21.1%, imports from Mexico were up 24% in 1994, and in 1995
U.S. investment in Mexico reached an all time high.'*^ However, despite its economic
advantages, like the GATT/WTO, the agreement has been widely criticized for its lack o f
social and environmental protection measures.'*^ For example, after the passage o f the
NAFTA many U.S. based companies moved to Mexico to take advantage o f the lower
labor costs and standards as well as more lenient environmental protection regulations
relative to the U.S. equivalents. Prior to the NAFTA, import restrictions made this
method o f production less profitable.

see D avid Gantz, Im plem enting the NAFTA Rules o f O rigin: A re the P a rties H elpin g o r H urting F ree
Trade? 12 Arizona Journal o f International Comparative Law 367 (1995)
H ow ever, in som e political spheres, the N A F T A has been recognized as having taken a step forward
from the GATTAVTO with respect to environmental provisions. For a more detailed discussion o f this
issue, see Richard Steinberg, Trade-E nvironm ent N egotiations in the E. U., NAFTA, a n d WTO: R egion al
T rajectories o f Rule D evelopm ent, 91 American Journal o f International Law 231 (1997). Steinberg also
advocates, using the W TO, N A F T A , and the European U nion as an example, that the closer the econom ic
integration achieved in an international trade agreements the more environm entally friendly the resulting
regulations w ill be:
T he extent to w h ich the rules and institutions o f organizations are environm ent friendly correlated
with the rank-ordering o f the depth o f integration in the trade organizations exam ined. An analysis
o f the process o f trade-environm enl rulem aking in each o f the three trade organizations has
confirm ed that the d eep en in g o f integration has increased the salien ce o f trade-environm ent issues
for richer, greener states and has led to dem ands by th ose states for m ore environm ent-friendly rules
and institutions.

B y this reasoning if the N A FTA 's trade measures m oved towards even more liberalization o f trade, the U.S.
being the richest, “greenest” party w ould subsequently be able to demand more stringent environmental
regulations. Unfortunately, under the current administration I w ould argue that this is highly unlikely.
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NAFTA
Chapter 3: Trade in G oods
Chapter 4; Rules o f Origin
Chapter 5: Custom s Procedures
Chapter 6 ; Energy and B asic
Petrochem icals
Chapter 7: Agriculture and SPS Measure
Chapter 8 : Em ergency A ction
Chapter 9; Product and Safety Standards
Chapter 10: Procurement
Chapter 11 : Investment
Chapter 12: Cross-Border Trade in
Services
Chapter 13: Enhanced
telecom m unications
Chapter 14: Financial Services
Chapter 15: C om petition Policy,
M onopolies, and State Enterprises
Chapter 16: Temporary Entry for
B usiness Persons
Chapter 17: Intellectual Property
Chapter 18: Administrative Provisions
Chapter 19: Antidum ping and
Countervailing D uty Dispute Settlement
Chapter 20: Dispute Settlem ent

Chapter 21 : Exceptions

A greem en t on E n viron m en tal
C oop eration
A greem en t on L a b o r C oop eration

W TO
G A TT 1994, A greem ent on T extiles and
Clothing
Agreem ent on R ules o f Origin
N o parallel but see Custom s Valuation
Code
N o parallel
Agreem ent on Agriculture, Agreem ent on
SPS M easures
Agreem ent on Safeguards
Agreem ent on Technical Barriers to
Trade
Agreem ent on Government Procurement
Agreem ent on Trade Related Investment
Measures
General Agreem ent on Trade in Services
(G ATS)
See G A TS, B asic Telecom m unications
Covered
See GATS
N o parallel, but see Understanding on
Interpretation o f GATT Article XVII
N o parallel
Agreem ent on Trade-Related Aspects o f
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
N ot applicable
N o parallel, but see D S U and Agreem ent
on Implementation o f GATT Article VI
Understanding on R ules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement o f Disputes
(D SU )
See GATT Articles X X , X xi and
Understanding on GATT Balance o f
Payment Provisions
N o p arallel
N o p arallel

T able 1 C om p a riso n o f N A F T A and W T O R equirem ents'48

48

This table was taken directly from Folsom (1999) Pgs 73-74
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2. Trade-Environment Conflicts Under the NAFTA

With respect to trade-environment conflicts under the NAFTA, four categories have
gained significant attention in recent years;'*^

•

Domestic health, safety and environmental protection - Governments are
restricted in their ability to impose domestic standards on imported goods to
protect the public health or the environment.^*^

•

Extrajurisdictional activity: endangered species, foreign pollution, and the "race
to the bottom

Governments are concerned about their ability to place

restrictions on imports based on their commitments to address environmental
concerns through other treaties,^' or as determined by production processes.
Additionally, many sectors are concerned about the effect o f the “race to the
bottom”^^ which describes competition among nations to loosen environmental
regulations, and labor standards in order to attract investment from foreign
companies.

•

Transboundary Remediation- As free trade increases, product transportation
traffic increases in border regions. In efforts to minimize costs, border regions

234
see GATT dispute panel report, United States - Restrictions on Imports o f Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994)
[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II\.
i.e. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f W ild Flora and Fauna, March 3, 1973,
27 U ST 1087, 993 U N TS 243 [hereinafter CITES]
i.e. freedom to utilize the concept o f a pollution tax - taxing products based on the amount o f pollution
created during production- is restricted,
see Daniel Etsy, G reening the GATT: Trade, Environm ent and the Future (1994)
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become areas o f high industrial activity. Thus border regions see extremely high
levels of environmental degradation in countries with loose environmental
standards. This problem has been highlighted in the case o f the U.S.- Mexico
border maquiladora^'^ region.

•

Trade- Environment Institutions- International trade agreements often create or
modify existing institutions to analyze and/or adjudicate^^ issues relating to
environmental concems.^^ As liberalization of trade increases, the ability o f these
institutions to perform their duties in compliance with the trade agreements that
created them comes into question.

3. Exceptions to Trade Restrictions Under the NAFTA

The NAFTA allows for many of the same exceptions, allowing for trade
restrictions under specific circumstances, as the WTO/GATT. However, the NAFTA
has been considered more environment-friendly than the WTO/GATT because it adds
additional allowances for environmental protection related exemptions. The sections
o f NAFTA that may potentially address environmental issues are covered in NAFTA
^ The maquiladora program w as established by the M exican government in 1965 and allow s duty-free
imports o f manufacturing com ponents to M exico for processing or assem bly o f products that must
subsequently be exported from M exico. For more detailed discussions o f the maquiladora program see
Leonard Novaro, B o rd er Towns M ired in Toxic Waste, 11 Pac. Mtn. Network N ew s 2-3 (Rural Com munity
A ssistance Corp., Sacramento, C A ) (Aug. 1993); Kristi Fettig Crim inal an d C ivil R em edies f o r
Transboundary Water Pollution, 15 Transnational Law 117 (2002);
and L esley J. W isem an ^ P la c e fo r "Maternity’" in the G lo b a l W orkplace, 28 Ohio N.V .L. Rev. 195
( 2001 ).

N ote that like the W TO dispute resolution process, with the exception o f N A F T A Chapter 11 dealing
w ith foreign investment, for all other issues, the N A FT A only grants standing to m ember governm ents,
and deliberations are not open to the public.
^ i.e. W TO Committees on Trade and the Environment, Sanitary and Phytosanitary M easures, and
Technical Barriers to Trade, and N A F T A ’s C om m ission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
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Chapter 21, Chapter l(art. 104), and the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation. Each of these is described below:

•

NAFTA Chapter 21- The text o f Chapter 21 o f the NAFTA defers specifically to
Article XX of the GATT/WTO. It says that for the purposes of trade in goods,
with the exception of provisions relating to services and investment:

GATT Article XX and its interpretive notes, or any equivalent provision of
a successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into
and made part of this Agreement. The Parties understand that the
measures referred to in GATT Article XX(b)^’ include environmental
measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and
that GATT Article XX(g)^* applies to measures relating to the
conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources.

The chapeau to GATT Article XX dictates that these provisions apply as long
as they are applied in a manner that does not:

constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on
international trade between the Parties.

Historically, these exceptions have been interpreted very narrowly

59

G ATT art. X X (b) states that trade may be restricted when “necessary to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health.”
GATT art. X X (g) states that trade may be restricted “relating to the conservation o f exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on dom estic production or
consum ption.”
Thom as, Schoenbaum, International Trade an d P rotection o f the Environment: the Continuing Search
f o r Reconciliation, 91 Am erican Journal o f International Law 268 (1997)
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NAFTA Chapter 1- Article 104 o f NAFTA Chapter 1 includes exemptions unique
to the NAFTA. It specifies that in the event o f any inconsistency between the
NAFTA and any other such agreement, the NAFTA will prevail except when one
o f the listed Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) exists.
Additionally, Article 104.1 sets out that additional MEAs may be added to the list
provided that it is agreed upon in writing by the parties involved. The currently
listed MEAs include: (a)CITES;^° (b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer;^^ (c) the Basel Convention on the Control o f
Transboundary Movements o f Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal;^^ (d) the
agreements set forth in Annex 104.1. Article 104 specifies that these conditions
will prevail when inconsistencies arise provided that “where a Party has a choice
among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such
obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is least inconsistent with the
other provisions o f this Agreement.”

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.^^ The NAAEC, also
known as the environmental side agreement, was negotiated by the Clinton
Administration to gain support for the NAFTA from environmental
organizations.^ The NAAEC requires member countries to effectively enforce

supra note 51
signed in Montreal on September 16, 1987, amended 1990 [hereinafter the M ontreal P rotocol]
signed in Basel on March 22, 1989 [hereinafter the B asel Convention] (the U .S. has not yet ratified this
agreement)
Implemented with the N A F T A on January 1, 1994 [hereinafter
C]
^ The environmental com m unity w as markedly split in its support o f the N A F T A with organizations such
as the National W ildlife Federation, the W orld W ildlife Fund, the Environmental D efense Fund, the
Natural Resources D efense Council, the National Audubon Society firmly in favor and other organizations
such as the Sierra Club, Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace, the Humane Society, Clean W ater A ction,
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their own environmental laws, prohibits them from lowering their environmental
standards, and requires them to try to improve them. It also created the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) through which citizens have
standing to have their complaints heard with regard to a party’s failure to enforce
its environmental regulations. The text prohibiting parties from lowering their
environmental regulations to attract industry is not subject to panel review and
therefore has not proven to be very effective. The CEC can reject a complaint by a
two-thirds vote, and similarly will only release the Secretariat’s report to the
public on a heard complaint by a two-thirds vote. Lastly, the agreement provides
for sanctions against any country that is found to have engaged in a “persistent
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws.’’^^ Although the
NAAEC deserves mention as a small step forward with respect to environmental
protection under international trade agreements, to date it has not proven
particularly effective in its goals. However, it does create the potential for a safe
harbor in which Canada may impose environmental protection measures related to
climate change protected under the NAAEC. This will be discussed in greater
length in Section VII below .^

Rainforest Action, the Am erican Society for the Prevention o f Cruelty to Anim als, Environmental Action
and m any other strongly opposed to the treaty. See Andres Rueda, Tuna, D olphins, Shrimp,
Turtles:
What A bou t E nvironm ental E m bargoes U nder NAFTA? 12 The Georgetown International Environmental
Law R eview 647 (2000)
John Knox, N AFTA's E nvironm ental P rovisions: Vl^iat P roblem s w ere they In ten ded to A ddress? 23
Canada-U.S. Journal 403 (1997)
For further discussion about the N A A E C see ibid, and David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environm entM aking the Side A greem ent Work, 12 Arizona Journal o f International and Comparative Law 603 (1995)
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III. MEAs vs. International Trade Agreements

Although to date there have not been any documented disputes
surrounding conflicting obligations under International Trade Agreements and
MEAs, the potential for such a conflict has made this issue the subject o f much
discussion.^^ Besides the Kyoto Protocol, a number o f MEAs have called for
trade measures that may be deemed in conflict with the provisions of
GATT/WTO and/or NAFTA.

These

include

the CITES,^® the

Basel

Convention,^’ and the Montreal Protocol.^’ Neither the WTO/GATT nor NAFTA
have rules governing the mode o f dispute resolution under such circumstances
presumably because until recently they had not been pressured to do so.

A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’^

In the event of a conflict between an International Trade Agreement and a
MEA, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties offers some direction.

see Charles Fletcher, G reening W orld Trade: R econciling G ATT an d M u ltilateral Environm ental
A greem ents within the E xisting W orld Trading Regim e, 5 Journal o f Transnational Law and P olicy 341 ;
Chris W old, M ultilateral E nvironm ental A greem ents a n d the GATT: Conflict an d R esolution?, 26
Environmental Law 841 ; and R yan Winter, R econciling the GATT and WTO with M ultilateral
E nvironm ental A greem ents: Can w e H ave our Cake and Eat it Too?, 11 Colorado Journal o f
Environmental Law and P olicy 223 (2000)
supra note 51; CITES restricts the import and export o f endangered species
^ supra note 62; The B asel Convention regulates the import and export o f hazardous wastes.
Supra note 61; The Montreal Protocol regulates the trade o f substances that deplete the ozone layer.
G ATT created bodies such as the Group in Environmental Measures and International Trade (GEMIT)
and the Com m ittee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) have thus far failed in their efforts to establish
rules clearly governing how to resolve conflicts betw een M E A s and GATT. See B ill O ’Connor, Trade and
the Environm ent: An U pdate on the G ATT Agenda, 4 Eur. Envtl. L. Rev. 20, and Report o f the WTO
Com m ittee on Trade and the Environment N ovem ber 14, 1996 PRESS/TE 014 (1996)
Vienna Convention o f the Law o f Treaties, M ay 23, 1969, 1155 U .N .T.S. [hereinafter the Vienna
Convention or the Convention]
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Article 30 o f the Vienna Convention states the rules for two broad scenarios. The
first involves a conflict between two nations that are both party to the
International Trade Agreement and to the MEA. Under this scenario, the terms o f
the most recent agreement will prevail over the earlier agreement.

Furthermore,

under this scenario, the Vienna Convention contains the rule o f lex specialis,
which allows for a more specific treaty to supercede a less specific treaty when
the two relate to the same issue, irrespective o f the date o f the two treaties.

The

second scenario is one in which both countries involved in a dispute belong to one
agreement but only one party belongs to the second agreement.

The Vienna

Convention is clear that under such conditions the agreement to which both
nations are member will g o v e rn .C le a rly , the second scenario describes the rule
which would govern the issue addressed in this paper. Therefore, the following
discussion will cover how such a dispute would be analyzed Irom the position of a
WTO or NAFTA dispute resolution panel.

IV. Emission Reduction Units Classified as “Products”

Predicting the WTO and/or NAFTA classification of ERUs is a daunting task.
There is no precedent for classification of AAUs or any similar instrument under the

The Vienna Convention does not stipulate how to determine the official “date” o f an agreement in the
case o f amendments made to one or more o f the conflicting agreements.
See Winter supra note 67

.Sgg zW. at 238
Per the rules described above, in the case o f a trade dispute betw een the U .S. and Canada, N A FT A w ill
supercede the WTO. However, due to the lack o f case law on sim ilar issues under N A FT A , as well as due
to the potential breath o f this discussion as it applies to other W TO member nations which are non-Kyoto
Protocol members this paper w ill cover W TO/GATT case law as it relates to N A F T A requirements.
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WTO or the NAFTA.^’ The limited published work on the topic^^ reveals arguments both
in favor o f and against the classification o f AAUs as “products.” Werksman recognizes
the potential for their classification as “products” because AAUs will have a market value
and may therefore be considered a “commodity.” However, he goes on to argue that this
classification is unlikely because historically WTO panels have interpreted “products” to
be “tangible goods.”^^

Other authors repeatedly refer to AAUs as tradable

‘commodities’ but do not offer any guidelines for use of this term.^° Nevertheless,
because the possibility does exist for AAUs to be classified as “products,” this paper will
nevertheless discuss the potential implications of such a classification. Specifically, this
paper will discuss the potential for Canada to exclude non-Kyoto Protocol nation derived
AAUs from Canada’s domestic trading market through statutory authority or exclusion.
The following section will focus on the possibility for legal statutory exclusion o f nonParty derived AAUs by way GATT and NAFTA exemptions.

A. Historical Dispute Resolution: Statutory Exclusion

In the event that Canada ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, it is likely that Canada will
incorporate the Protocol into domestic law through statute. If this is to occur, the trade
restrictions contained in the Kyoto Protocol, limiting use of, and trade in AAUs fi-om
non-Party nations, may be effectively viewed as a unilateral trade sanction. Unilateral
See supra note 4 at 255
^ S ee supra note 4 and Tania V oon, Sizing Up the FfU'O: Trade-Environm ent Conflict an d the K voto
P rotocol, 10 Journal o f Transnational Law and P olicy 1 (2000) at 93 H ow ever, I will not refer to Tania
V oon s argument because she incorrectly represents W erksm an's argument in her citation o f his work (at
93), leading me to question her authority on this topic.
su pra note 4 at 255
See R osenw eig et. al., The Em erging International G reenhouse G as M arket, P ew Center on Global
Clim ate Change, at iv, 2, 3, and Diringer at 3
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trade sanctions refer to internal regulations or trade barriers imposed by one country that
affect the importation of goods or services o f one or more other countries. At first glace
it would appear that such a sanction would be impermissible under NAFTA or the
GATT/WTO rules. However, it is possible for a unilateral sanction to be placed on an
exporting party’s goods if the conditions fall under one o f the NAFTA or GATT/WTO
exemptions described in Section II.(B) and (C)*^ above, i.e. those restrictions do not
constitute arbitrary, or unjustifiable discrimination, they are necessary for the protection
of human, animal or plant life or health, or they relate to the conservation o f an
exhaustible natural resource under NAFTA Chapter 21.

In the case of a trade dispute between Canada and the U.S., a NAFTA panel would
likely hear the case rather than a WTO p a n e l.H o w e v e r, a NAFTA panel has yet to rule
on a trade dispute based on imposition of a unilateral trade sanction. Therefore, because
the relevant environmental provisions are identical under NAFTA and the G ATT/WTO,
the following discussion will focus on how these types of disputes have been historically
decided by WTO panels.

Dispute resolution panels will tend to employ similar methodology in interpreting
GATT Article XX(b) and (g). In interpreting Article XX(b) the panel will often ask three
questions in order to determine applicability:

(1) Is the substance o f the measure in

N A F T A also provides exceptions for National Security protection and Canadian and M exican Cultural
Industries. These w ill not be discussed in this paper.
A s governed by the Geneva Convention on Treaties, in the case o f a discrepancy betw een two
multilateral agreements, the later treaty to which all parties involved in the dispute are signatories shall be
given deference.
supra note 59 at 276
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question the protection o f human, animal, or plant life or health?; (2) Is the measure
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health?; and (3) Is the measure
applied in such a manner so as to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and/or a
disguised restriction on international trade? The operative language is the word
“necessary,” which can be interpreted in one o f two ways. First, “necessary” can take the
“protection o f human, animal, or plant life or health” as its object, and therefore be
interpreted to mean that the measure taken is necessary for the protection o f that object.
Alternatively, it can be interpreted to mean that the measure is a necessary departure
from the GATT because it “entails the least degree o f inconsistency with other GATT
provisions.” The latter of these two interpretations has been favored by recent GATT
panels.*'*

Mirroring the methodology employed in interpreting Article XX(b), interpretation of
GATT Article XX(g) has often been carried out by dispute resolution panels based on the
following analysis: (1) Is the measure related to the conservation o f exhaustible natural
resources?; (2) Does the specific measure relate to the protection o f exhaustible natural
resources?; (3) Are the invoked measures made in conjunction with identical domestic
measures or restrictions?; and (4) Are the measures applied in accordance with the
chapeau of Article XX?*^ In answering these questions, the phrase “relating to” has
sometimes been interpreted to mean that the measure is “primarily aimed at”*^

S4 ■

i.e. Thailand- Restrictions on Importation o f and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Novem ber 7, 1990 30
I.L.M. 1122
85
supra note 59 at 277
see Canada - Measures A ffecting Exports o f Unprocessed Herring and Salm on, March 22, 1988 GATT
B .I.S.D . (35"’ S u p p .)98 (1988)
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conservation. However, as seen below in the U.S. Gasoline Standards

panel decision,

the scope o f this interpretation has also been significantly limited through an alternate
more narrow interpretation o f the phrase “relating to” to mean “necessary or essential.”

In addition to direct interpretations o f GATT Article XX(b) and (d), the question
o f extraterritoriality has also been subject to review and interpretation with respect to
unilateral trade sanctions. The history o f this interpretation will be discussed in relation
to the conflicting interpretations of the panels that heard Tuna /Dolphin 1** and 11*^ as
discussed below.

Cases taken to WTO dispute resolution panels^*^ have challenged unilateral sanctions
imposed by member nations which claimed that the imposed measures fell under one or
more o f the exceptions described above. Five of these cases are described below. Panel
decisions are not binding on future panels, and therefore do not offer concrete guidelines
or arguments for future dispute settlement. However, they do offer a glimpse at the
trends in interpretation of the law that we can expect under similar circumstances. One
such circumstance may be a Canadian sanction on U.S. created AAUs.

1. Tuna / Dolphin I and II Cases

United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional G asoline, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996)
[hereinafter U.S. G asoline Standards]
^ United States - Restrictions on Imports o f Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1598 (1992) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin /]
U nited States - Restrictions on Imports o f Tuna, 33 I.L.M . 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II]
^ To date, parallel disputes have not been decided by a N A F T A panel, however because the same
exceptions being challenged above also apply under N A F T A these decisions can be assum ed to be
indicative o f a N A F T A panel decision as w ell. H ow ever, it is important to note that dispute resolutions are
not formally binding to future panel decisions under G A TT/W TO or N A FTA .
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i) Historical Overview

The “purse-seine” method is commonly used by fishing fleets worldwide to fish
for tuna. The method involves the release o f a large net, up to a mile long^' that traps
tuna and whatever else happens to be in the vicinity. Because dolphins tend to follow
tuna, fishermen commonly search out the more visible dolphins to determine where to
throw their nets. As a result, thousands of dolphins^^ are trapped and killed in the nets
each year. In response to citizen concern over the fate o f dolphins and other marine
mammals the U.S. Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act o f 1972^^
(MMPA). The MMPA was designed to protect dolphins by regulating domestic fishing
techniques and imposing an embargo on foreign countries that did not conform to these
regulations. The MMPA placed an embargo on tuna and tuna products from foreign
nations that were harvested in a manner that is harmful to dolphins until such time as the
Secretary of Commerce certifies that the incidental kill rate o f dolphins for a particular
nation is in compliance with U.S. standards.^"^ The MMPA also placed an embargo on
intermediary nations^^ that imported tuna or tuna products from a country that harvests

supra note 64
An average o f 300,000 dolphins are killed by fishermen each year by U .S. fishing fleets alone. See supra
note 64 at 648. In the 1950"s at the height o f the use o f the purse-seine method m illions o f dolphins were
netted and killed along w ith tuna. See Joseph U rgese, D olphin Protection an d the M am m al P rotection A ct
H a ve M et Their M atch: The G eneral A greem ent on Tariffs a n d Trade, 31 AJcron Law R eview 457 (1998) at
464
16 U .S.C . §1361-1407 (1985) [hereinafter MMP.4], as amended by the International Dolphin
Conservation Program Act, 111 Stat. 1122 (1997) [hereinafter IDCPA]
^ 16 U .S.C . §1371 (a )(2)(B )(ii)(l) (1997) provides that “the average rate o f incidental taking by vessels o f
the harvesting nation is no more than 2.0 tim es that o f United States vessels during the same period by the
end o f the 1989 fishing season and no more than 1.25 tim es that o f United States vessels during the same
period by the end o f the 1990 fishing season and thereafter.” See supra note 92 at 465
“[T]he term ‘intermediary nation’ m eans a nation that exports yellow fin tuna or yellow fin tuna products
to the United States and that also imports yellow fin or yellow fin tuna products that are subject to a direct
ban on importation into the United States pursuant to section 1371(a)(2)(B ) o f this title.” S ee M M PA §
1362(5)
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tuna in a manner that is harmful to dolphins. The unilateral sanctions imposed by the
MMPA have been challenged a number o f times under GATT/WTO. As seen in the
discussion below, the challenges were made citing GATT law that is replicated under the
NAFTA. Therefore, the panel interpretations o f the law are noteworthy in analyzing the
potential for a Canadian sanction against U.S. created AAUs to fall under one o f the
corresponding NAFTA exceptions.

ii) Tuna/Dolphin I Dispute

In 1991 Mexico requested that a GATT Dispute Resolution Panel be assembled^^
to reconcile the disparity between the sanctions imposed by MMPA and U.S. trade
obligations under GATT. Mexico claimed that MMPA conflicted with the GATT
Article 111 (“national treatment obligation” o f imported “like products”), and Article
XI (prohibiting quantitative restrictions). Additionally, Mexico claimed that the
MMPA did not fall under any o f the Article XX exceptions. Mexico argued that
Article XX(b) did not apply, this meant that the embargo was not “necessary” to the
protection of dolphin life and health because alternative means, such as international
cooperation through MEAs, consistent with the GATT, were available to protect
dolphin life and health. Additionally, Mexico argued that Article XX(g) was
inapplicable because the U.S. was not primarily concerned with the protection of
dolphins, and that the measure was designed to create a disguised barrier to
international trade.

^ Pursuant to their rights under GATT Article XXII:2
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The panel found Article III inapplicable because it only applies to “products,” not
“processes.”^^ They argued that tuna taken by purse-seine methods are the same as
tuna taken by any other method and are therefore “like products” which cannot be
discriminated between. Therefore, because the MMPA was regulating “process” o f
harvesting tuna and not the “product” itself, the Act did not fall into the scope of
Article III. Furthermore, the Panel found that the MMPA did not qualify for
exemption under any o f the Article XX provisions. Their decision hinged on the
interpretation of two key issues. The first was the use o f the word “necessary,” as
discussed above. The panel interpreted the “necessary” requirement o f Article XX(b)
to “refer to the trade measures requiring justification under Article XX(b), [and]
no t.. .to the life or health standard chosen by the contracting party.”’^ Effectively this
meant that a nation can impose unilateral sanctions to protect the life and health of
humans, animals, or plants only it has have exhausted all other alternatives. The
panel decided that the U.S. had not done this, and therefore the policy measure was
not “necessary.”^

The second issue o f interpretation related to the ability o f a nation to apply
unilateral sanctions extraterri tori ally, or the ability o f the U.S. to impose regulations
that were effective outside U.S. geographical ju r is d ic tio n .T h e panel ruled that
although these were not disguised trade restrictions, natural resources and living
A lthough the panel did not officially rule on Article III it stated that even i f the U.S. had solely regulated
the sale o f tuna products internally, it still w ould have been in violation o f Article III(4)’s national
treatment mandate based on inconsistencies betw een requirements for dom estic and foreign vessels.
supra note 92 at 477
^ Som e argue that this decision ignored the fact that the U .S. had been engaged in negotiations to establish
an M E A to protect dolphin life and health for approximately forty years. See Steve Charaovitz, D olphins
a n d Tuna: An A nalysis o f the Secon d G A TT P an el Report, 24 Environmental Law Reporter (1994)
N ot to be confused with extrajurisdictionality see ?????Shoenberg? LOOK UP LATER
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things'®' could only be protected under those provisions which were within the
geographical jurisdiction o f the country concerned. Similarly, in its interpretation o f
Article XX(g), the panel ruled that a party can impose “trade measures primarily
aimed at conservation of exhaustible natural resources solely within their own
jurisdiction.'®^ This meant that the U.S. was unjustified in imposing unilateral
sanctions aimed at conserving dolphins in areas under Mexican jurisdiction. Because
Article XX did not apply the panel ruled that the U.S. was in violation o f Article XI
o f the GATT.'®^ The panel stated that although parties can impose regulations
affecting the internal sale o f products, they could not place restrictions on the
processes by which those products were produced.

Hi) Tuna/Dolphin II Dispute

In 1992 the European Economic Community (EEC), later joined by the
Netherlands, filed a request for a WTO panel to review a similar issue with respect to
EEC and Dutch fishing fleets. The EEC and the Netherlands challenged the
intermediary nation embargo contained in §1371(a)(2)(C) o f the MMPA.'®'' They
claimed that it violated Article XI o f GATT,'®^ and that it was not an internal
regulation permitted under GATT Article III. Thirdly, the EEC and the Netherlands
i.e. humans, animals, and plants pursuant to G ATT Article X X (b)
H ow ever, as w e w ill see in Tuna/Dolphin II there is no language that lim its the scope o f a parties actions
to their ow n territories.
This panel decision was never carried out due to political reasons surrounding the anticipated adoption
o f the N A FT A . M ex ico ’s rejection o f the decision was w id ely view ed at a diplomatic measure aimed at
urging U .S. Congress to pass the N A FTA . The U .S. and M exico independently negotiated terms o f an
agreement surrounding the tuna/dolphin issue.
A s described above, the intermediary nation clause o f M M PA placed an embargo on all nations that
imported tuna or tuna products from a nation that m ay be subject to the direct U .S. tuna embargo.
Article XI o f GATT prohibits quantitative restrictions on imported goods from member nations.
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argued that GATT Article XX was inapplicable because the measures were taken
outside U.S. jurisdiction. The U.S. claimed that the embargo was protected under
GATT Articles XX(b),(g), and (d).'°^

The panel found that the intermediary nation embargo was not a justifiable
measure “relating to the enforcement at the time or point o f importation o f an internal
law, regulation, or requirement that applied equally to the imported product and the
like domestic product.”
Therefore, the panel ruled that the intermediary embargo
was in violation o f GATT Article III. The panel further ruled that because the
embargo was in violation o f Article III, it also violated Article X I’s quantitative
restriction prohibition.

The panel’s analysis o f Article XX is o f particular interest. In its analysis o f
Article XX(g), the panel imposed a three prong analysis similar to that described
above in Section IV (A). First, the panel affirmed that dolphins are in fact an
exhaustible resource and that the U.S. policy was indeed a measure designed at
conserving that resource. Mirroring the argument adopted by Mexico in
Tuna/Dolphin I, the EEC and the Netherlands argued that even if dolphins are an
exhaustible natural resource, the U.S. could not impose its regulations
extraterritorially to protect them. Unlike the decision in Tuna/Dolphin I, the panel
disagreed and ruled that there was nothing in the text of the GATT to limit the scope
of a protective measure to a nation’s own ju ris d ic tio n ,fin d in g “no valid reason for

Article X X (d) as amended in 1994 states that nothing in the GATT agreement shall prevent parties from
im posing measures:
necessary to secure com pliance with law s or regulations w hich are not consistent w ith the
provisions o f this Agreem ent, including those relating to the custom s enforcem ent, the
enforcement o f m on o p o lies.. the protection o f patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the
prevention o f deceptive practices.”
see GATT Article III
This decision was reinforced by general international law principles which state that with respect to
natural resources outside their territory “states are not in principle barred from regulating the conduct o f
their nationals.”
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supporting the conclusion [reached by the Tuna/Dolphin I WTO dispute resolution
panel] that the provisions o f Article XX(g) apply only to .. .the conservation o f
exhaustible natural resources located within the territory of the contracting party
invoking the provision.”

They did rule, however, that this extraterritoriality could

only be applied with respect to the countries’ own nationals and vessels.
Nonetheless, this is a landmark decision opening the door for the first time to the
validation o f extraterritorial measures aimed at protecting a natural resource.

Second, the panel examined the issue o f whether the embargo was applied “in
conjunction” with domestic restrictions and policies and if those policies were
primarily aimed^

at the conservation o f dolphins. In its analysis, the panel noted

that the intermediary embargo restricted the importation o f tuna products from
affected nations, regardless o f whether the tuna was harvested in a manner harmful to
dolphins. Therefore, the policy was not “primarily aimed” at the conservation o f
dolphins. The panel also ruled that because the primary embargo was not held against
nations harvesting tuna in accordance with U.S. standards, even if their method was
harmful to dolphins, the measure was not applied equally to all nations,’ and
therefore violated the GATT. Furthermore, the panel ruled that because the U.S.
embargoes could not effectively conserve dolphins unless other nations changed their
own domestic conservation policies in accordance with those o f the U.S., the primary

supra note 89
' The panel chose to adopt the interpretation o f previous panels. They interpreted the phrase: “related to
the conservation o f exhaustible resources” to mean “primarily aimed at the conservation o f exhaustible
natural resources.”
' " i t would be interesting to note i f the panel took into account that there may be other methods, that are
not in accordance w ith U .S. standards, o f harvesting tuna without harming dolphins, i.e. as in the
Shrimp/Turtle case described in Section IV (A )(2).
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and intermediary nation embargoes were not permissible under the GATT. Lastly,
the panel ruled that based on the above analysis, the U.S. embargoes were also in
violation o f the chapeau to Article XX. '

The analysis of Article XX(b) mirrored much of the panel’s reasoning in its
interpretation of Article XX(g). The EEC and the Netherlands did not challenge the
MMPA on the grounds that it was not designed for “the protection o f human, animal,
or plant life or health,” therefore the panel did not address this issue. Instead, the
EEC and the Netherlands again argued the issue o f extraterritoriality. In accordance
with its interpretation o f Article XX(g), the panel ruled that nothing in GATT limits
the scope of a nation’s unilateral policies as such. Second, the panel analyzed
whether the embargoes were “necessary” to protect dolphin life and health. Again, in
accordance with its analysis of Article XX(g), the panel ruled that it was not
“necessary” because the policies could not accomplish their objectives without
forcing domestic policy changes in the affected nations.

Lastly, in response to the U.S. claim that the embargo fell under the exception in
Article XX(d),"^ the panel ruled that because the primary nation embargo was
inconsistent with GATT Article XI(1), it could not be justified under this exception.

2. Shrimp / Turtle Cases
The chapeau to Article X X states the following:
Subject to the requirem ents that such m easures are not applied in a m anner w hich would constitute a
m eans o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim ination betw een countries where the sam e conditions
prevail, or a disgu ised restriction on international trade, notliing in this Agreem ent shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcem ent by any contracting party o f m e a su r e s...

s,upra note 106
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i) Historical Overview
A similar dispute was brought before the WTO dispute resolution panel in
1997 by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand."'^ This dispute involved unilateral
trade sanctions imposed by the U.S. upon countries whose shrimp harvesting methods
result in the killing o f high numbers o f incidental sea turtles. One such method is the
use o f driftnets, or “curtains o f death.” *'^ Driftnets,"^ are huge fishing nets up to
thirty miles long and forty feet wide'

which are left to move freely with ocean

currents and ensnare whatever comes into their path. The United Nations has called
for a moratorium on the use of driftnets."® A second method, the use of shrimp
trawlers, also causes high levels of incidental sea turtle takings. National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) studies have shown that up to 48,000 sea turtles are killed
annually by U.S. fishing fleets off o f the G ulf o f Mexico and the South A tlantic,"’
other studies show that close to 125,000 turtles die each year worldwide as a result o f
shrimp trawling and tuna harvesting activities.

In response to these studies, the

NMFS developed the Turtle Excluder Device (TED), which significantly decreased
the numbers o f sea turtles taken during shrimp harvesting operations.'^' In 1989

Other W TO members also challenged the import ban with oral arguments. Including: Australia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, the European U nion, Guatemala, Hong K ong, Japan, N igeria, Philippines, Singapore,
and Venezuela. See Susan Sakmar, F ree Trade and Sea Turtles: The International an d D om estic
Im plications o f the Shrim p-Turtle Cases, 10 Colorado Journal o f International Environmental P olicy and
Law 347 at 357
Paul Stanton K ibel, Justice fo r the Sea Turtle: M arine Conser\>ation an d the Court o f International
Trade, 15 U C LA Environmental Law and P olicy 57 at 60
Driftnets are outlawed for use by U .S. fishing fleets see High Seas Driftnet Moratorium Protection Act,
16 u s e § 1826 (1999)
su pra note 64 at 649
see L a rge-scale P ela g ic D riftnet Fishing and its Im pact on the Living M arine resources o f the W orld's
O ceans a n d Seas, G.A. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 46''' Sess. 79'*’ plen. m tg., U.N . D oc. A /R es/46/215 (1991)
supra note 64 at 649
supra note 115 at 59
T E D ’s can free up to 97% o f incidentally taken sea turtles and can be installed for approximately U.S.
$5 0 -6 0 0 per boat. See su pra note 64 at 649.
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Congress passed Section 609 o f Public Law 101-162, an appropriations act that
amended the Endangered Species A c t.'^ Section 609 prohibits the importation of
shrimp jfrom countries whose shrimp harvesting methods fail to meet U.S. standards
through the use o f TEDs or other comparable protection measures.

ii) WTO Panel Decision

In arguing this case, the complainants contended that they already had domestic
conservation plans in place aimed at the conservation o f sea turtles, and that use o f a TED
was not the only shrimp harvest method effective in avoiding the incidental takings o f sea
turtles. In response, the U.S. argued that because the use o f trawling nets caused the
highest number o f incidental mortality of sea turtles, use o f a TED on trawling vessels
was necessary for the conservation o f the s p e c i e s . T h e U.S. argued that the
conservation measures taken by the complainants to protect sea turtles were ineffective.
In turn, the complainants argued that the use o f TEDs was cost prohibitive and/or not
entirely effective for use on shrimp trawlers. Additionally, two non-govemmental
organizations (NGOs) had submitted documentation concerning sea turtle ecology to the
panel for review under Article 13 o f the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

The panel

ruled that because the documents were unsolicited they were not permitted to take them
into account. However, the panel did invite either party to include the documents as part

16 U .S.C . ÿ 1533(d) (1994)
see R eport o f the P a n el on U nited States - Im port P roh ibition on C ertain Shrim p an d Shrim p Products,
M ay 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 [hereinafter
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlem ent o f Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
112 (1994) [hereinafter D SU ] Additionally, the Dispute Settlem ent B ody (D SB ) is established by the D SU
to assist in dispute resolution betw een parties.
123
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o f its own submissions. Specific to GATT requirements, the plaintiffs argued that the
U.S. had violated GATT Article Xl'^^ and that the embargo was not justified under
GATT Article XX exemptions.

The U.S. did not dispute that the embargo violated GATT Article XI(1), instead
they argued that since the embargo was justified by Articles XX(b), (g) and (d), the
violation was irrelevant. Accordingly, the panel concurred that the embargo was in
violation of GATT Article XI(1).

The complainants argued that Article XX did not justify the embargo because the
U.S. could not invoke a measure to protect turtles outside o f its jurisdiction. In
evaluating the applicability o f Article XX, the panel focused on the Article chapeau.
The panel chose to interpret the term “unjustifiable” in the context o f the overall object
and purpose of the GATT : to promote economic development through free trade. The
panel stated that a member is only justified in using Article XX exemptions to deviate
from the requirements o f GATT when done in a way not to undermine the objective o f
the agreement. Based on this interpretation, the panel ruled that Section 609 did not fall
within the scope o f Article XX and therefore, the U.S. was “unjustified” in using Article
XX exemptions to qualify the embargo.'"^

Hi) WTO Appellate Body Decision

supra note 30
supra note 112
127

The panel also noted that in efforts associated with environmental protection, M E A s are a preferred
m ethod to unilateral sanctions. See supra note 123 para 7.50
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Under political pressure from environmental groups and other politicians,
President Bill Clinton appealed the WTO panel decision. The dispute was brought to a
WTO Appellate Body in 1998. The U.S. appealed the panel decision on two grounds:
(1) The panel erred in finding that it could not review unsolicited infoimation from
NGOs; and (2) The panel erred in finding that Section 609 did not fall within the scope o f
Article XX.

The Appellate Body found that the panel had indeed erred in its interpretation o f
Article 13 of the DSU. The Appellate Body ruled that the panel had the “discretionary
authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to it,
whether requested by the panel or not.” '^*

Regarding the second issue, the Appellate Body ruled that the panel had erred in
its interpretation o f the chapeau. It ruled that the panel “did not inquire specifically into
how the application o f Section 609 constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.” '^^ Additionally, the Appellate Body rejected the
panel’s chapeau down approach. The Appellate Body stated that the appropriate way to
interpret Article XX, was primarily by justifying or rejecting its applicability under
Sections (b), (g) or (d), followed by justification or rejection under the conditions in the
chapeau.
see Report o f the A ppellate B ody United States - Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, October 12, 1998.
129
see ibid. at para. 114.
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In its analysis o f Article XX(g), the Appellate Body addressed the issue o f
whether Section 609 applied to an “exhaustible natural resource.” In accordance with past
panel decisions, it ruled that sea turtles are indeed an exhaustible natural resource. Next,
it examined whether Section 609 is “related to the conservation” o f sea turtles. The
Appellate Body found that based on the amount o f scientific evidence provided to the
panel regarding the mortality rate associated with shrimp trawling and the effectiveness
o f TEDs, the measure was indeed “related to conservation” o f sea turtles. Lastly, the
Appellate Body examined whether Section 609 was a “measure made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic” harvesting o f shrimp. The Appellate Body
found that indeed it was, as the U.S. had corresponding regulations affecting domestic
fishing vessels.

Having justified Article XX(g)’s applicability to Section 209, the Appellate Body
turned to the chapeau o f Article XX. It examined the issues o f “unjustifiable
discrimination,” and “arbitrary discrimination” as they relate to Section 609
requirements. First, in examining the issue o f “unjustifiable discrimination,” the
Appellate Body ruled that the U.S. was indeed in violation. It found four reasons: (I) the
U.S. embargo was aimed at forcing other member nations to adopt policy changes; (2) the
embargo did not permit imports of shrimp from vessels using TEDs if those shrimp
originated in waters under the jurisdiction of nations not certified under Section 609;'^^
(3) the U.S. failed to engage in multilateral negotiations to solve the problem before

Similar to the requirements under M M PA, Section 609 required that nations’ shrimp harvesting m ethods
be certified by the U .S.
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implementing the embargo; and (4) the U.S. gave differential treatment to different
affected member nations through the application o f phase-in periods and transfer o f TED
technology. Next, the Appellate Body looked at the issue o f “arbitrary discrimination.” It
found that the “rigidity and inflexibility” o f the certification process under Section 609
constituted “arbitrary discrimination.” It referenced the fact that in order for a nation to
receive certification, Section 609 essentially requires it to adopt shrimp harvesting
policies identical to those of the U.S. The Appellate Body also found that the lack of
“transparency” involved in the certification process not only amounted to “arbitrary
discrimination,” but was also violated the GATT Article 111(3).*^' The Appellate Body
noted the lack of opportunity for a nation to respond or argue against a negative
certification decision.

Based on the above analysis, the Appellate Body ruled that despite the
applicability of Article XX(g) to Section 609, this appropriations act failed to meet the
requirements of the chapeau of GATT Article XX. They recommended that the U.S.
bring its policies into compliance with its obligations under the GATT. Despite the final
Appellate Body decision, this ruling is significant in that it opens the door for member
nations to impose unilateral sanctions on other member nations provided that certain
requirements are met.

G A TT Article 111(3) provides that:
Each member shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all it’s laws,
regulations, decisions, and rulings...E ach member shall maintain, or institute as soon as
practicable, judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia,
o f the prompt review and correction o f administrative action relating to custom s matters.
G A T T Article X X IV defines transparency guidelines for member nations.
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3. U.S. Gasoline Standards Case
i) Historical Overview

The Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990 established programs for reformulated
and conventional gasoline. The programs required changes in the composition o f gasoline
sold to consumers. A baseline year o f 1990 was established by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which affected domestic and foreign companies in different
ways. Domestic companies were permitted to establish individual baselines based on
their own 1990 data. Foreign companies, however, were not given similar liberty, and
were required to use a statutory baseline set by the EPA. The WTO dispute resolution
panel concluded that this restriction was (1) not consistent with Article 111:4 o f the GATT
which outlines the National Treatment P r i n c i p l e ; a n d (2) could not be justified by any
Article XX exceptions. The case was subsequently taken to an Appellate Body which
reached the same final conclusion, although through vastly different reasoning, as
discussed infra.

ii) Appellate Body Decision

Although the WTO panel decided that the conditions of the sanction placed on
foreign gasoline did not satisfy the requirements of the GATT Article XX(g), the
Appellate Body decided that those requirements were indeed satisfied. However, the

Report o f the Appellate B od y in the United States - Standards for the Reform ulation and Conventional
G asoline, M ay 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603
133
D iscussed in 11(B)(1) above
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Appellate Body also decided that the measure constituted “unjustifiable discrimination,”
and a “disguised restriction on international trade.” The Appellate Body added that:

[T]he kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a
particular measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” may
also be taken into account in determining the presence of a “disguised restriction”
on international trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and
object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules
available in Article XX.

The Appellate Body stated that the U.S. could have avoiding violating GATT Article
111:4 by allowing equal treatment to foreign and domestic companies. This could have
been done in one o f two ways; (1) allowing foreign companies to establish their own
baselines; or (2) imposing a statutory baseline on domestic companies. The Appellate
Body further stated:

These two omissions go well beyond what was necessary for the Panel to
determine that a violation of Article 111:4 had occurred in the first place. The
resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent
or unavoidable.'^^

The Appellate Body was justified in its analysis of the U.S.’s use o f “unjustifiable
discrimination” between nations with respect to establishing baselines and therefore its
violation o f GATT Article III. This decision highlights the necessity o f vigilant analysis

United States - Standards for Reformulated and C onventional Gasoline, Appellate B ody Report 35
I.L .M . 603 (1996)

'^ \W a t6 2 8
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o f GATT provisions to avoid clear violations as was evident in the U.S. Gasoline
Standards Case.

4. Asbestos Case*^®
i) Historical Overview
In the Asbestos Case, the Canadian government challenged a French ban on
imports o f asbestos or asbestos-containing products. The decision in the landmark case
represents the first time that a WTO panel found that a trade measure in conflict with the
substantive obligations of the GATT justified under GATT Article XX. The case
subsequently went to an appellate body, which, while upholding the Panel’s overall
conclusion, chose not to rely on Article XX but instead focused on GATT Articles
111:4’^^ and X I . The Appellate Body ruled that the trade measure in question did not
represent a violation of Article III and was therefore permissible under GATT.

ii) Panel Decision
The Canadian government contended that the French ban violated GATT Article
III because the asbestos products it exported to France were “like products” to substitute
products manufactured in France. France claimed that the ban fell within the exemptions
allowed for in GATT Article XX. In order to determine whether Canadian asbestos was
indeed a “like product” to the French alternative product, the Panel employed a three
prong analysis. It analyzed; 1) the end uses o f the products; 2) consumers’ tastes and

'-’6 W TO Panel Report on European Com m unities - M easures A ffecting A sbestos and A sbestos-Containing
Products, W T /D S135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), at http://ww w.wto.org [hereinafter
Panel Report]
outlining the N ational Treatment Principle
prohibiting any quantitative restrictions on imports
42
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habits; and 3) the products’ properties, nature, and q u a l i t y . T h e Panel ruled that the
Canadian and French products were “like products’’ because they had similar end uses
and were therefore subject to the scrutiny, and in violation o f the GATT Article III.
Therefore, the Panel found that the French ban was in violation o f the GATT Article III.
However, the panel found the ban justified under GATT Article XX(b) as well as the
GATT Article XX chapeau.

The panel ruled that the ban fell within the scope o f GATT Article XX(b) because
asbestos presented a significant risk to human health. It reached this decision despite
Canada’s claims that because the asbestos was encapsulated in cement products it did not
present a human health risk due to exposure.

The panel went on to rule that the ban

was indeed “necessary,” because there does not exist an alternative method to protect
human health which is “less inconsistent” with the requirements o f the GATT.’*^^ Next,
the panel turned to the Article XX chapeau and examined the issue o f “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination.” It ruled that because France imposed the ban against all
asbestos products regardless of their country o f origin, the ban did not constitute
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.” Lastly, the panel examined whether or not the
ban constituted a “disguised restriction on international trade.” It defined “disguised” to
mean “conceal[ed] beneath deceptive appearances, counterfeit, alter so as to deceive.

Laura Y avitz, The W orld Trade O rganization A ppellate B ody Report, E uropean Com m unities M easu res Ajfecting A sbestos a n d A sbestos-C ontaining Products. M arch 12, 2001, W T/DS135/AB/R, 11
Minn. J. G lobal Trade 43
Expert testim ony w as taken into account to com e to this decision.
The panel exam ined and rejected the method o f “controlled use” o f asbestos in order to make this
determination. See supra note 139 at 54.
supra note 139 at 56
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The Panel concluded that because the sanction was published and the WTO was notified
o f the measure was not “disguised.”

in) Appellate Body Decision

This landmark decision, allowing an exception under Article XX, was
subsequently appealed to a WTO/GATT Appellate Body.*'*^ The Appellate Body also
reached a landmark decision that was not simply an upholding of the original Panel’s
ruling. The Appellate Body found the French measure consistent with French obligations
under the GATT. It concluded that the ban did not violate GATT Article Ill’s National
Treatment principle, and therefore the Article XX exceptions did not apply. It’s method
o f analysis is described below.

In reaching their decision, the Appellate Body focused on the definition of “like
products.” It stated that the Panel had not analyzed the term “like products” thoroughly
because the Panel had not taken into account the “risk”'"*'^ factor in its analysis. The
Appellate Body also noted that products competitive with one another are considered
“like products.”

In its analysis, the Appellate Body used the same framework criteria

as the Panel. Namely, it used a market-based approach examining; 1) physical properties;
2) end uses; and 3)tariff classification. Additionally, the Appellate Body noted that these

It is interesting to note that in making it's decision the A ppellate B ody chose to prohibit the subm ission
o f any documentation from NG O s. This is in stark contrast to the decision made b y the Shrimp/Turtle
A ppellate Body.
supra note 139
supra note 139 at 59
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criteria simply served as a framework for analysis and other aspects could be included.
The Appellate Body compared the “physical properties” of the Canadian asbestos to the
French alternative product. It noted that the “physical properties” must be analyzed in
light o f the effect that differences in such properties may have on the marketability o f the
p r o d u c t s . I t went on to write that the health risk should be included in the analysis o f
“physical properties,” as well as with respect to “consumer taste,” because the health risk
may have significant impact on these two issues. Based on these facts the Appellate Body
found that the Canadian asbestos and the French substitutes were not “like products”
because the Canadian products had an associated health risk while the French substitute
did not. The Appellate Body went on to clarify its decision by stating that for “likeness”
to be determined, a member nation must provide two things: 1) evidence of unlikeness
based on different end uses; and 2) a showing that the number of similar applications
outweighs the number o f dissimilar a p p l i c a t i o n s . B a s e d on its findings described
above, the Appellate Body declined to review criteria based on “consumer taste and
habits,” or “tariff classification.” ''*^

B. Under What Conditions Would a Canadian Imposed Trade Sanction on U.S.
Derived AAUs Be Permissible Under WTO/GATT and NAFTA?

su pra note 139 at 59
W TO Appellate B od y Report on European Com m unities - M easures Restricting Asbestos and
A sbestos-C ontaining Products, W T /D S135/A B /R at w w w .w to.org [hereinafter Appellate Body Report] at
para 114
su pra note 139 at 61
Canada also challenged the French ban under other sections o f the GATT including Article 2 o f the TBT
Agreem ent, GATT Article XXIII: 1(b), and GATT Article XL B ecause these arguments are not relevant to
G A TT Article X X exem ptions, they w ill be not be discussed in this paper.
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A close analysis o f the decisions made in the cases described above, as well as some
additional inquiry, must be employed before attempting to answer this question.
Furthermore, the lack o f formal binding precedent set by WTO panels on fiiture WTO
panel decisions, and on future NAFTA panel decisions, eliminate the guarantee with any
degree o f certainty that the conclusion reached by one Panel would be followed by
another. However, an examination o f the facts at hand can provide insight into what
would likely transpire i f past interpretations o f the law made by WTO panels are taken
into account by future NAFTA panels. As noted above in Section 11(C)(3), NAFTA
Chapter 21 defers explicitly to GATT Article XX. Therefore, references to, and the
language of, GATT Article XX will be used in the following discussion. The reader is
advised that GATT Article XX is effectively the same as NAFTA Chapter 21 for the
purposed o f this analysis.

1. Would a Canadian Unilateral Sanction Fall Under the Scope of Article XX?

The very nature of a unilateral sanction, or ban, conflicts with member obligations
under WTO/GATT and NAFTA, as it places a quantitative restriction on products
imported from other member nations, and thereby also favors like products created
domestically. Therefore, a Canadian unilateral sanction imposed against U.S. created
AAUs would likely violate the NAFTA and the GATT’s most favored nation (MFN),
and/or national treatment principles, as well as their prohibitions on quantitative
restrictions placed on imports from other member c o u n t r i e s . H o w e v e r , GATT Article

supra notes 27, 29, and 30
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allows for exceptions to these requirements under specific conditions. Therefore,
if the Canadian sanction can be justified under GATT Article XX it may, nonetheless, be
permissible under GATT and NAFTA. It is important to note however, that to qualify for
Article XX exemptions ERUs must be deemed “products” under GATT and NAFTA.
This assumption has been made below.

Based on the cases discussed above, there are a number o f requirements that must be
met in order for a unilateral Canadian sanction against U.S. created AAUs to fall under
the scope o f Article XX. Each of these questions is examined below.

i) Article XX(b)

Article XX(b) requires us to ask the question; is such a measure related to the
conservation of human, animal, or plant life or health? This is a difficult question to
answer in that the sanction itself only protects Canada firom economic loss as a result o f
not being able to account for U.S. created AAUs under the rules o f the Kyoto Protocol.
Certainly the sanction does indirectly protect human health in that it removes one
potential barrier preventing Canada from participating in the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto
Protocol in itself certainly pertains to, and is arguably necessary, to the conservation o f
human, animal and plant life and health for a number o f reasons. Among the threats to
human health, scientific literature cites a number o f problems in response to increased
global temperature including increased death rate among the “very young, very old, and
sick” populations, introduction o f and increase o f tropical diseases such as malaria.
151

and corresponding N A F T A Chapter 21
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cholera, Lyme disease, and encephalitis, increases in air and water borne parasites, and
loss o f habitation due to increased sea level as polar ice caps melt.'^^ Animal life and
health is also threatened by the effects o f global warming. One, o f many examples
includes Thai tropical fish populations. Tropical fish are extremely sensitive to small
increases in water temperature. Experts anticipate that even a one to two degree
temperature increase in sea water will increase fish susceptibility to various diseases.
Lastly, scientific literature also suggests that plant life and health will suffer as a result o f
global warming. According to one peer reviewed journal article:

Indirect effects of elevated CO2 on trees and forests are likely to be as, or more
important than their direct effects on photosynthesis. For example, elevated CO]
can decrease N[itrogen] concentrations and increase nonstructural carbohydrates
and secondary metabolites, all of which can alter tree resistance to pests and
herbivores...

It is unclear how a NAFTA panel may interpret an indirect link between the
sanction and the requirements of Article XX(b). However, based on the historical trend
o f WTO/GATT dispute resolution panels to favor fi*ee trade over environmental and
human health issues whenever possible, it is unlikely that a NAFTA panel will be able to
jump the gap and find a connection between the sanction and requirements o f Article

see Fiona G odlee, H ealth Im plications o f C lim ate Change, British M edical Journal, v303 n l2 p 254
(N ov, 1991) and M cM ichael, Anthony and Haines, Andrew, G lobal Clim ate Change: the p o te n tia l effects
on health. British M edical Journal, v315 n 7 1 11 p805 (Sept, 1997) For additional information about the
effects on human populations due to global warming see Norm an M yers, Environm ental R efugees in a
G lo b a lly W a rn ed World, B ioScience v43 n l 1 p752 (1993)
Jordan G old, Thai Fish Industry in H ot Water, Alternatives Journal, v28 i2 p3 (Spring, 2002)
John Aber et. al. F orest P ro cesses an d G lobal E nvironm ental Change: P redictin g the Effects o f
Individual a n d M ultiple Stressors, B ioS cience v51 i9 p735 ( Sept 2001)
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XX(b). Nevertheless, for the sake o f argument suppose a NAFTA panel does indeed find
that the sanction is related to the protection o f human health. In this case, the necessity of
the sanction must be analyzed in conjunction with the policy the sanction is designed to
protect.

Therefore, the next question is: whether the sanction and/or the Kyoto Protocol
are “necessary” for the protection o f human health. Depending on how one interprets the
meaning of “necessary,” as discussed in the above cases, the U.S. could use two broad
arguments to assert that a sanction is not necessary: (1) There is a lack o f scientific
evidence on global climate change to justify that a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
are necessary to protect human health, and (2) The sanction and/or the Kyoto Protocol are
not necessary due to the availability o f other options that are “less inconsistent” with
member obligations under N A F T A . F i r s t , one must look at the interpretation of
“necessity” as it relates to the protection of human health. The United States participation
in the UNFCCC serves as an acknowledgement o f the global warming problem.
Furthermore, U.S. participation in the Montreal P r o t o c o l i s evidence to the fact that the
methods undertaken by the Kyoto Protocol to slow down the effects o f global warming
and ozone layer depletion have been accepted by the U.S. in the past. Additionally,
participation in negotiations leading up to the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as
George W. Bush’s proposal o f an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol relying on similar, but
A s noted in W TO docum ent SAVPPS/W /9, The R elevance o f the D isciplines o f the Agreem ents on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on Import L icensing Procedures to Article VI;4 o f the General
A greem ent on Trade in Services (11 September, 1996, p. 5), “A measure that has the effect o f restricting
trade can be considered “necessary” only i f there is no alternative measure less disruptive o f trade which a
M em ber may reasonably be expected to em ploy to achieve the same p olicy objective”.” -W T O web site
found 5/26/02
' ^ The Montreal Protocol controls the release o f certain other greenhouse gases not addressed in the Kyoto
Protocol for the purposes o f slow ing down depletion o f the ozone layer
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voluntary, measures also serves as a U.S. acknowledgement o f the necessity for the
emission reductions called for by the Kyoto Protocol. Lastly, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency recently released a report acknowledging that climate change is a
problem that we should be concerned about.

The economic implications relating to the

case where Canada is forced to accept U.S. created AAUs is outside the scope o f this
paper. Therefore, this paper assumes that the sanction is necessary from an economic
standpoint for Canadian participation in the Kyoto Protocol.

Regarding the second potential interpretation of the term “necessary,” claiming
that there are other options that would not require the use of a sanction forcing Canada to
deviate from its obligations under NAFTA, there are a number o f issues to consider.
First, and foremost, it is absolutely imperative that before employing a unilateral
sanction, Canada engage in extensive discussions with the U.S. in attempts to solve the
problem multilaterally. As seen in the Tuna/Dolphin cases, as well as in the
Shrimp/Turtle case, the panels strongly emphasized the importance o f attempting to
resolve conflicts between international trade agreements and MEAs through the
multilateral agreement rather than resorting to unilateral action. The NAFTA itself, in
Chapter 21 Section 104, permits for amendment to the agreement in order to list
additional MEAs, such as the Kyoto Protocol, as exempt from the obligations of the
agreement. If this outlet were not properly exhausted before the implementation of a
unilateral sanction, the results would likely be catastrophic to Canada’s case.

See “The Third N ational Com m unication on Clim ate Change U .S. Climate A ction Report" (2002)
A vailable at w w w .epa.gov
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For the purpose o f discussion, assuming the U.S. refuses to amend Section 104 to
include the Kyoto Protocol, the burden still remains on Canada to demonstrate that it has
exhausted all other options to resolve the problem o f global climate change without
causing them to deviate from their obligations under NAFTA. If such a demonstration is
made, the Kyoto Protocol, and thus the sanction protecting it, may qualify as “necessary”
under this second interpretation o f the term. Evidence that all options have been
exhausted will be found in the extent to which the international community, including the
U.S., has been involved in negotiations surrounding the problem o f climate change since
the inception of the UNFCCC. The mere existence o f the UNFCCC, and the series of
negotiations and discussions that have been undertaken, is further evidence to the fact
that other options have been explored and rejected, justifying the necessity o f the Kyoto
Protocol in combating the problem. Lastly, George W. Bush’s widely criticized
alternative to the Kyoto Protocol and its rejection by the international community as a
viable alternative, could be evidence to the fact that all other options have been explored
and rejected. Therefore, Canada should be able to argue successfully that a unilateral
sanction on U.S., and all other non-party nation, derived ERUs falls within the scope of
Article XX(b) and/or the NAFTA equivalent.

ii) Article XX(g)

Article XX(g) requires asking the question o f whether a measure relates to the
conservation o f an exhaustible resource. Answering this we are left with the same
predicament. Although the Kyoto Protocol is related to the protection o f many
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exhaustible natural resources (i.e., island nations, coastal habitats, polar ice caps, fishing
industry resources, etc.), the sanction itself is a form o f economic protection, and not in
itself directly related to the protection o f these resources.

For the sake o f argument, assume that a NAFTA panel accepts the fact that,
although not directly linked, because the sanction is a necessary precursor to Canadian
participation in the Kyoto Protocol, it is in fact “related to” the conservation o f
exhaustible resources. This raises the question o f whether the measure being invoked is
made in conjunction with domestic measures or restrictions. The answer to this question
will ultimately lie in the wording o f the sanction itself. The sanction must be tfamed so
as to affect participation in the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading system at an
individual, corporate, national, and international level equally. If it fails to do so, the
sanction would not have a direct effect on domestic Canadian industry, and may therefore
be found to violate National Treatment principle. In the absence of an explicit reference,
it may be argued that the sanction is not being invoked in conjunction with domestic
measures. Simple testimony to Canada’s participation in the Protocol may not be enough.
Canadian policy must explicitly affect any emitter, Canadian or not, who is not in
compliance with, or working towards meeting Kyoto Protocol commitments.

Hi) Article X X Chapeau

Assuming that the sanction and the associated Kyoto Protocol are justified under
either Article XX(b) or (g), the panel would then turn to analysis of the chapeau of
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Article XX. The chapeau first requires examination o f whether the measures represent
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against international trade. Assuming the
sanction affects all nations equally, i.e., any individual, corporation, or nation not in
compliance with Kyoto Protocol commitments, the sanction is not arbitrary
discrimination but equally imposed, calculated discrimination. Under these
circumstances, the Canadian government has carefully chosen who will be affected by
the ban and has presumably given good reason for the ban, i.e. the ban excludes those
who chose not to participate in the protection o f the human, animal and plant life and
health through membership under the Kyoto Protocol.

The question o f whether the sanction is “justifiable discrimination” is a bit more
complicated. Clearly, Canada is justified in its concern that if forced to accept U.S.
created AAUs, it will not be able to account for them in order to meet Canadian
requirements under the Kyoto Protocol.’^* However, the Tuna/Dolphin I and II panels
ruled against the U.S. because they interpreted their unilateral trade sanction to be
unjustifiable in that they were forcing domestic policy changes on other member nations
in order for those nations to gain access to U.S. markets. This appears to be the critical
issue. It is quite likely that a unilateral Canadian sanction on non-Kyoto Protocol
member created AAUs will be viewed as a sanction designed to force policy changes,
i.e., the adoption o f the Kyoto Protocol, by NAFTA or WTO member nations who are not
party to the Protocol at the time o f implementation of the sanction. The Tuna/Dolphin II

158

supra note 1
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panel explicitly stated that unilateral m e a s u r e s a t t e m p t i n g to influence policy changes
in other member nations is simply not acceptable under GATT.'^^ On the other hand,
other GATT panels, such as the Appellate Body reviewing the Shrimp/Turtle case,
recognized that unilateral sanctions are inherently designed to influence policy changes in
nonconforming nations, and that in some cases, and under certain conditions this may be
justified. They approach recognition o f the fact that a unilateral sanction is initially
imposed to account for differences in domestic policy, and by establishing this as an
unconditionally unjustifiable conflict with GATT or NAFTA, the Article XX exemptions
are essentially self defeating. Specifically, the Appellate Body states:

Conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market'^' on whether exporting
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by
the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures
falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article
XX. Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions to
substantive obligations established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic
policies embodied in such measures have been recognized as important and
legitimate in character.
The Appellate Body added:

i.e. the unilateral sanction protecting Canadian econom ic interests under the K yoto Protocol, N O T the
Protocol itself.
supra note 50
In this case, I am referring to Canada's im plementation o f a unilateral sanction, mirroring it’s
obligations under the multilateral K yoto Protocol, which would restrict U .S. access to Canadian A A U
markets. An alternative argument can be made b y Canada that it is actually the K yoto Protocol that calls
for these restrictions on trade, and because the K yoto Protocol is a multilateral agreement which the U .S.
opted not to take part in, a Canadian unilateral sanction designed to protect Canadian interests under the
K yoto Protocol should not be subject to the intense scrutiny generally im posed by W TO/GATT panels on
unilateral sanctions. H ow ever, the Geneva C onvention on Treaties clearly states that in the case o f conflict
betw een two international/multilateral treaties, that which is later in date and sign ed by all p a rtie s involved.
shall take precedence. Canada has essentially given up it's right to partake in any international agreements
that conflict with N A F T A and/or GATT unless all parties involved in these previous agreements consent.
Therefore, it w ould seem that the only w ay for Canada to restrict access to A A U markets under the Kyoto
Protocol is to prove that trade in ERUs falls within an exception to GATT and/or N AFTA or that they are
not subject to N A F T A and/or GATT restrictions in the first place. This paper will exam ine both o f these
alternatives.
su pra note 123
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We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO
cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea
turtles. Clearly, they can and should.

Unfortunately, the Appellate Body does not clarify specifically how a member nation can
do this without being in violation of WTO or NAFTA restrictions. Therefore, it is
necessary to look at specifics of their interpretations for direction. Although this is a step
in the right direction, because WTO panel decisions are not binding on future WTO or
NAFTA panels, one is left with uncertainty as to how any particular panel will interpret
the law at hand. However, the above analysis provides some direction as to how AAUs,
and policy actions designed to protect a market in AAUs, may circumvent NAFTA
and/or WTO restrictions.

V. Emission Reduction Credits: Classified as “Services”

Another, arguably more likely, possibility is that the WTO and/or the
NAFTA will classify AAUs as “services.” If AAUs are indeed classified as
“services” they will be subject to the rules contained in the GATS. The GATS
contains many o f the same stipulations as the GATT including clauses mirroring
the Most Favored Nation P r i n c i p l e , a n d the National Treatment Principle.

G ATS Article II states:
w ith respect to any m easure covered by this Agreem ent, each M ember shall accord im m ediately
and unconditionally to services and service suppliers o f any other Member treatment no less
favorable than it accords to like services and service suppliers o f any other country.

G ATS Article XVII states:
In sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein,
each M ember shall accord to services and service suppliers o f any other M ember, in respect o f all
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Additionally, the GATS contains a clause dictating that domestic market access
be accorded equally to all member n a t i o n s / T h e r e f o r e , member obligations to
these principles may conflict with obligations under the Kyoto Protocol emissions
trading system in the same way as discussed in Section IV, a b o v e . I n the event
that AAUs are classified as “services,” and a Canadian unilateral sanction is
challenged by a WTO or NAFTA member n a t i o n , a WTO or NAFTA tribunal
would hear the case. Irrespective o f ERU classification (i.e., goods or services),
the same rules would apply (i.e., MFN and national treatment). Therefore, it is
likely that a similar line o f reasoning would be employed as discussed in Section
IV(B) cases above. The following section will examine the key differences
between the GATT and the GATS as they relate to trade in AAUs. Furthermore,
this section will discuss how these differences may affect trade in AAUs under
the Kyoto Protocol.

A. GATS Exceptions

1. General Exceptions

measures affecting the supply o f services, treatment no less favorable than it accords its own like
services and service suppliers.

G ATS Article XVI (l)sta tes that:
With respect to market access through the m odes o f supply identified in Article I, each Member
shall accord services and service suppliers o f any other M ember treatment no less favorable than
that provided for under the terms, lim itations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.

Section IV discusses the potential for ERUs to be classified as 'g o o d s’ and the associated WTO./NAFTA
conflicts.
That is a non-Party to the K yoto Protocol
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GATS Article XIV contains a similar, albeit more narrow, environmental
exception to the GATT. GATS Article XIV states:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
like conditions [Emphasis added] prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of
any measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.

Although this clause is almost identical to that found in the GATT Article XX,
looking carefully at the language reveals one key difference. The GATT requires
that for this exemption to be used, “same conditions,” i.e. identical conditions,
must exist in the two countries involved. The GATS solely requires that “like
conditions,” i.e similar conditions, exist in the two countries i n v o l v e d . T h i s
shift in language clearly broadens the coverage of the GATS agreement in
comparison to the GATT. Such language will make it more difficult to exempt
trade in AAUs between U.S. and Canada based on differences in the “conditions”
in the two countries.

Moreover, it is difficult to predict how a WTO dispute

resolution panel would interpret this exemption with respect to the emissions
trading system established by the Kyoto Protocol, because to date this provision
has yet to be interpreted by such a panel.

GATS Article X IV (b) and (c)
The potential im plications o f this shift in language w ill be discussed further in Section VI
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2. Exempted Services

The GATS differs most significantly from the GATT in that, like the
GATT, it is not entirely inclusive o f all services. Whereas the GATT strictly
controls all trade related to goods among members, the GATS does offer some
options for exclusion with respect to trade in services. Member nations have two
options to restrict application of the GATS to specific service sectors. The first of
which lies within the text of GATS Article X X . Article XX requires each Party
to designate whieh specific service sectors are subject to GATS compliance. All
service sectors accept those named therein must fully comply with the GATS
market access and national treatment requirements.

These choices are

documented in each Member’s GATS Schedule of Commitments.

Therefore,

parties may impose quantitative restrictions and restrict market access to trade in
specific services with respeet to market access and national treatment obligations.

Second, each party has the opportunity to exempt from GATS restrictions
specific measures which would otherwise violate its obligations under the Most
Favored Nation Principle.’

This exemption only applies to the restricted service

for a limited period o f time, generally not to exceed 10 y e a r s . T h e s e options

G ATS Article X X specifically states:
Each M em ber shall set out in a schedu le the sp ecific com m itm ents it undertakes under Part 111 o f this
Agreem ent. W ith respect to sectors w here such com m itm ents are undertaken, each S ch ed u le shall sp e c ify ;
(a) term s, lim itations and con d ition s on market a ccess
(b) con d ition s and qualification on national treatment

G A TS A nnex on Article II Exem ptions
G A TS Annex on Article II Exem ptions (6)
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may provide an avenue to exempt trade in AAUs from the provisions outlined in
the GATS agreement. Exploring this possibility requires asking: 1) If AAUs are
classified as “services,” which sector o f services they will belong to; (2) Whether
Canada has fully liberalized that service sector, thereby subjecting trade in AAUs
to GATS national treatment and market access obligations; and (3) If so, whether
there is a way to list trade in AAUs as an exempted service.

Each o f these

questions are discussed below.

i) Service Sector Classification

Jacob Werksman suggests that AAUs might be covered by the GATS
Fifth Protocol on Financial S e r v i c e s . H e suggests the possibility that AAUs
maybe considered “negotiable instruments,” and therefore subject to GATS'^'^
trade restrictions.'^^ As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, a “negotiable
instrument” is:

A written instrument'’^ that (1 ) is signed by the maker or drawer, {2)includes an
unconditional promise or order to pay a specified sum of money, (3) is payable
on demand or at a definite time, and (4) is payable to order or bearer (UCC § 3104(a))

A s defined in G A T S, Annex on Financial Services, para 5(a)(x), “financial services” include;
trading for ow n account or for account custom ers, w hether on an exchange, in an over-the-counter-m arket, or
oth erw ise...d erivative products including, but not lim ited to, futures and options.. .transferable
securities,. . .other negotiable instruments and financial assets.

N ote Chapter 14 o f the N A F T A outlines the Financial Services obligations, however, due to the
potential breath o f im plication, this paper will focus primarily on the text o f the GATS.
supra note 4
W here an “instrument” is defined as:
a written docum ent that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities, such as a
contract, w ill, prom issory note, or share certificate.
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If the international emissions trading system guidelines are designed in a manner
similar to that of established U.S. systems, it is likely that AAUs will be
documented in both electronic and paper certificate form. It is unlikely that these
certificates will contain all three requirements listed above to be considered
“negotiable instruments.” Although the certificate itself may indeed have the
signature o f the maker or drawer (i.e., government agencies responsible for
creating them), it is unlikely that it will also state an unconditional promise to pay
a specified sum o f money on its face. As is the case in U.S. domestic markets, a
contract associated with the sale o f an AAU will likely contain this information.
Therefore, perhaps the contract negotiated to purchase or sell a specified quantity
o f AAUs may be considered a “negotiable instrument.” However, because the
contract is once removed from the AAU certificate, (i.e., it merely facilitates the
trade, and is not itself the object o f the trade), it is difficult to determine whether
the AAU certificate would be considered a “negotiable instrument.”

The GATS Annex on Financial Services also subjects trading in all “other
financial assets” to GATS provisions.

Some may argue that a certificate

documenting ‘ownership’ is not a financial asset, but instead a permit allowing a
particular activity. However, an AAU certificate indeed appears to be a “financial
asset” because it can be bought and sold in an open market system. Assuming
that international emissions trading markets work in a similar manner to U.S.
emissions trading markets, one does not have to be an affected source to
participate and/or profit from trading activities.

In other words, there are no
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exisitng provisions preventing traders’^’ or other unaffected profiteers from
participating in the market. Therefore, because one can profit from the market
without having any need for an actual “permit” to pollute, an AAU certificate
should indeed be considered a “financial asset.”

Another alternative would treat AAUs as “securities,” and thus trade in
this service would be regulated by the GATS. A “security” is defined to include:

...any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly know as a ‘security,’ or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe or to purchase, any of the
foregoing.*’*

It is possible that an AAU certificate may be considered a “transferable
share,” because (1) it is transferable from one person or government to
another person or government; and (2) it represents the ownership o f a
portion o f total allowable carbon dioxide, or carbon dioxide equivalent,
e m i s s i o n s . I f an AAU certificate were considered a “security” it would

“Traders” buy high and sell low , as opposed to “brokers” who negotiate trades for clients but do not
generally take title to the credits.
Securities A ct o f 1933 ÿ 2(a)(1)
B lack ’s Law Dictionary defines a ‘share’ in part as : “an allotted portion ow ned by, controlled by or due
to som eone”
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certainly apply to the AAU certificate itself and not the contract negotiated
for the sale o f such a certificate as may be the case if AAUs are classified
as “negotiable instruments.”

If an AAU were considered a “negotiable instrument,” a “financial asset,”
or a “security,” it still remains unclear whether that “negotiable instrument,”
“financial asset,” or “security” is itself considered a “service,” or alternatively if
this simply applies to the process by which they are traded. A more pertinent
issue may thus be the effects o f allowing market access into an international
emissions trading system to non-Kyoto Protocol member nations. As described
above, a financial service includes “trading for own account or for account of
customers,...negotiable instruments and financial services.” ' T h e r e f o r e , if
AAUs are considered “negotiable instruments,” “financial assets,” or “securities,”
the process by which they are traded'^' will likely be subject to GATS provisions.
Brokerage houses that broker client AAU trades may be considered ‘service
suppliers’ because they provide the ‘service’ of trading a financial asset, even if
that particular financial asset is not covered by the GATS.'^'^

!80

Annex on Financial Services 5(a)(x)(F)
i.e. the ‘service’ is the trading, not the A A U s them selves.
Please refer to the text o f the G ATS Annex on Financial Services in Appendix B. N ote that the Annex
does not state that all ‘financial assets' are considered ‘services,’ and therefore subject to G ATS provisions,
but solely that trade in ‘financial assets' is considered a ‘service’ subject to GATS provisions. Furthermore,
G A TS Article 1(2) clarifies the scope and definition o f the agreement in stating:
For the Purposes o f this A greem ent, trade in services is defined as the supplv o f a service [Em phasis added]:
(a)
from the territory o f on e M em ber into the territory o f any other Member;
(b) in the territory o f on e M em ber to the service consum er o f any other M ember;
(c) by a service supplier o f o n e M em ber, through the presence o f natural persons o f a M em ber in
the territory o f any other M ember.
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If this is the case, it is likely that Canada will be forced to allow U.S.
brokerage houses to participate in a Canadian AAU market.

In other words,

Canada could not restrict market access to these U.S. financial service providers.
The GATS does not restrict financial service providers with respect to client
nationality, therefore, U.S. brokerage houses may be able to provide legal market
access to U.S. corporations and/or investors. These U.S. organizations and/or
individuals could potentially profit fi'om AAU trading system, regardless of the
fact that they may not have taken on the economic burden o f mandatory, legally
binding emission reductions at home. This foreign participation could potentially
drive up the cost of AAUs'^^ to the point o f making them inaccessible to
Canadian companies.

ii) Implications o f Canada’s Schedule o f Commitments

In order to ascertain which sectors of its services are fully subject to these
agreements we must look to Canada’s Schedule of Commitments'^'^ under the
GATS and the NAFTA.

Canada has not liberalized all sectors of trade in

financial services under the GATS.'®^ Although, they have set a number of
reservations and requirements for foreign financial service suppliers, none are
likely to affect a U.S. owned brokerage house engaging in brokerage of AAUs,

For a detailed analysis o f market and policy im plications o f U.S. participation in the K yoto Protocol
em issions trading system see Baron, Richard et. al., K yo to Without the U.S.: M arket a n d P olicy
Im plicatiom -D R A F T , International Energy A gency
The section o f this Schedule o f Com m itments that pertains to trade in financial services under the GATS
can be found in Appendix D . The full text o f Canada’s Schedule o f Comm itments under N A FT A can be
found in Appendix C.
W ith the exception o f som e Provincial exceptions, which w ill not be discussed in this paper.

63
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

particularly if the company has an office located within Canada with Canadian
employees.

Furthermore, under the NAFTA, Canada has fully liberalized trade, except
with respect to cross-border trade in securities. Canada has reserved the right to
adopt any measure relating to cross-border trade in securities services that
derogates fi'om Article 1404(1)’^^ or, with respect to the U.S., from Article
1406.'^^ Therefore, only if AAUs are classified as “securities” will it be possible
for Canada to restrict U.S. participation in a Canadian AAU market. Otherwise, it
is likely that the WTO and/or the NAFTA may prohibit Canada from imposing
restrictions on either the country of origin of AAUs or on countries allowed
market access.

Werksman suggests that although a Party may not be able to place
quantitative restrictions on the “import” o f these services, once the service has
been ‘imported’ GATS cannot prohibit Canada from refusing to recognize the
validity of these s e r v i c e s . I n other words, if that WTO/NAFTA member is not
also Party to the Protocol, GATS does not prohibit Canada from prohibiting use
o f those allowances to meet Kyoto Protocol commitments. Furthermore, neither
the GATS nor the NAFTA will require Canada to purchase any specific quantity

TslAFTA Article 1404(1) states that;
N o Party may adopt any measure restricting any type o f cross-border trade in financial services by
cross-border service providers o f another Party that the Party permits on the date o f entry into force
o f this Agreement, except to the extent set out in Section B o f the Party's Schedule to A nnex VII.

N A F T A Article 1406 outlines the M ost-Favcred-Nation Treatment guidelines
Jacob Werksman and Jurgen Lefevere, WTO Issues R a ised b y the D esign o f an E C E m issions Trading
System. FIELD (Scoping Paper N o. 3) (1999) at 10
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o f AAUs from the U.S.

This means that although brokers and other private

entities in Canada may be free to purchase allowances from any WTO or NAFTA
member nation, the credits may nonetheless be worthless once they have entered
the country.

A well organized accounting system and registry for AAUs is

imperative under this scenario and will likely ensure protection o f Kyoto Protocol
member nation derived AAUs from economically unfair trading practices.

Hi) Altering the Schedule o f Commitments Coverage
It is possible for Canada to alter which services are covered under its
Schedule of Commitments.

If Canada were to go through the process o f

specifically excluding AAUs from its Schedule o f Commitments, Canada could
reduce the likelihood of encountering U.S. opposition to any access restriction
with respect to the emissions trading market. GATS Article XXI stipulates the
conditions and process by which a Member nation may modify and/or alter its
Schedule of Commitments. The relevant text from Article XXI is below.

GATS Article XXI

1. (a) A Member (referred to in this Article as the "modifying
Member") may modify or withdraw any commitment in its
Schedule, at any time after three years have elapsed from the date
on which that commitment entered into force, in accordance with
the provisions o f this Article.
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(b) A modifying Member shall notify its intent to modify or
withdraw a commitment pursuant to this Article to the Council for
Trade in Services no later than three months before the intended
date o f implementation o f the modification or withdrawal.

2. (a) At the request of any Member the benefits o f which under
this Agreement m ay be affected (referred to in this Article as an
"affected Member") by a proposed modification or withdrawal
notified under subparagraph 1(b), the modifying Member shall
enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on any
necessary compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations and
agreement, the Members concerned shall endeavour to maintain a
general level of mutually advantageous commitments not less
favourable to trade than that provided for in Schedules of specific
commitments prior to such negotiations.

(b) Compensatory adjustments shall be made on a most-favoured
nation basis.

3. (a)

If agreement is not reached between the modifying

Member and any affected Member before the end o f the period
provided for negotiations, such affected Member may refer the
matter to arbitration. Any affected Member that wishes to enforce
a right that it may have to compensation must participate in the
arbitration.
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(b) If no affected Member has requested arbitration, the modifying
Member shall be free to implement the proposed modification or
withdrawal.

4. (a)

The modifying Member may not modify or withdraw its

commitment until it has made compensatory adjustments in
conformity with the findings o f the arbitration.

(b) If the modifying Member implements its proposed modification
or withdrawal and does not comply with the findings o f the
arbitration, any affected Member that participated in the arbitration
may modify or withdraw substantially equivalent benefits in
conformity with those findings. Notwithstanding Article 11, such a
modification or withdrawal may be implemented solely with
respect to the modifying Member.

5. The Council for Trade in Services shall establish procedures for
rectification or modification of Schedules. Any Member which has
modified or withdrawn scheduled commitments under this Article
shall modify its Schedule according to such procedures.
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VI. Fleshing Out the GATT/GATS and the Possibility of Non-Violation’

It is possible that Article XX o f the GATT, and/or Article XIV o f the GATS will
fail to justify a Canadian unilateral sanction imposed upon U.S. created AAUs by the
reasoning discussed in the preceding sections. With this in mind, it is prudent to flesh out
the text o f the GATT and the GATS more completely and examine alternative points o f
argument that may not as yet have been explored. Additionally, it is possible that, as in
the Asbestos Appellate Decision, a WTO and/or NAFTA tribunal may find that trade in
AAUs is in accordance with the GATT, the GATS, and the NAFTA. In order to explore
the possibility o f this option, the two core principles, common to all three agreements
must be examined. Lastly, it is possible that trade in AAUs will not fall within the scope
o f the GATT/GATS or the NAFTA. The following section will first look to alternative
arguments based on subtleties of semantics in the trade agreements, as well as the
possibility for the U.S. to utilize the non-violation provisions o f the GATT/GATS or the
NAFTA. It will then turn to a close examination of the most favored nation, and national
treatment principles, and discuss the conditions necessary to escape violation o f these
principles within an international emissions trading system. Lastly, this section will touch
on the possibility o f AAUs falling outside the scope of these agreements.

A. Alternative Arguments

The arguments described below w ill be briefly introduced and explored in this paper, how ever as most
issues have not been interpreted by a W T O /N A FTA dispute resolution panel, detailed analysis o f how such
a panel w ould rule on these issues w ill not be undertaken b y the author.
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The discussions in the preceding sections analyzed the possibility for a Canadian
ban on U.S. created AAUs to fall within the scope of the GATT, the GATS, or the
NAFTA environmental exemptions. However, thus far this paper has only looked at this
possibility based on arguments used in case law. It is possible that the text o f these
environmental exemptions, in particular the chapeau to Article XX, can be broken down
further in search o f a valid argument. Furthermore, it is possible that the U.S., or other
non-Kyoto WTO member nations will utilize the “non-violation” clause contained in the
GATT and the GATS. The following section will discuss these two scenarios.

1. The Chapeau
An alternative argument requires looking back at the GATT Article XX
chapeau.’’®The chapeau states:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of a r b itr a r y
discrimination between countries where the s a m e
d is g u is e d r e s tr ic tio n

o r u n ju stifia b le

c o n d itio n s p r e v a il,

or a

on international trade, nothing in this Agreement

shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures.. .[Emphasis added]

As discussed in Section IV(B)(l)(iii) above, based on past panel decisions, a Canadian
sanction will likely be viewed by a NAFTA dispute resolution panel as “unjustifiable
discrimination.” This is because the sanction may be seen to force policy changes in
NAFTA member nations in order for the affected nation to gain market access into the

N A F T A Chapter XX I Article 2101 defers to the G ATT Chapter X X chapeau which states that the
exem ptions to GATT com pliance as discussed above shall apply as long as they do not constitute:
a m eans o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim ination b etw een countries where the sam e conditions prevail
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Canadian emissions trading market. However, the conditional part of the chapeau states
that the sanction must meet this justifiable requirement “in countries where the same
conditions prevail.” Therefore, one must now examine whether or not “the same
conditions prevail” in the U.S. and Canada.*^' It can be argued that because, unlike the
U.S., Canada is undergoing significant changes in its industrial sector to reduce CO 2 and
CO 2 equivalent emissions to 1990 levels pursuant to its obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol, the “same conditions” do not “prevail” in the two nations. Under these
conditions the sanction would meet the exemption requirements o f NAFTA Chapter XXI,
and corresponding GATT Article XX. As discussed in Section V{A)(1) above, it is
interesting to note the shift in language between the GATT and the GATS with respect to
this particular clause. The GATT requires that the “same conditions” prevail to meet the
conditions o f the clause, while the GATS only requires that “similar conditions” prevail.
Clearly, this shift in language expands the scope o f the GATS provisions and narrows the
room for exception to these provisions under the agreement. It is difficult to ascertain
how this argument would be interpreted as it pertains to the GATS because it has yet to
be heard in such a context. It is unclear what conditions are sufficient to categorize
conditions in two separate countries as “like” as opposed to “same.” Furthermore, it is
unclear whether this difference in the use of words will be viewed as a mere semantics.

2. Nullification or Impairment

Pursuant to N A F T A Chapter XXI Article 2101(2);
Provided such measures are not applied in a manner that w ould constitute a m eans o f
arbitrary or imjustifiable discrimination betw een countries where the sam e conditions
p r e v a il or a disguised restriction on trade betw een Parties
[Emphasis added]
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The GATT Article XXII and the GATS Article XXIII contain language intended
to further protect the member benefits under these two Agreements. These Articles allow
a Party to file a complaint against another Party if the former believes that its benefits
under the GATT/GATS have been nullified or impaired. This clause allows for a
complaint to be filed regardless o f whether the “offending” Party has violated any
GATT’^^ or GATS’^^ provisions. These proceedings can result in one Party being
authorized to “suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such
concessions or other obligation under [the GATT],”

or in the “modification or

withdrawal o f the measure.” *’^ Three specific elements must be present in order to
establish an Article XXIII claim: 1) The existence o f an applied measure by a WTO
Member; 2) The existence o f a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and 3)
Nullification or impairment of the benefit as a result of the measure.

Under Article XXIII o f the GATT/GATS, the U.S. may have standing to seek
compensation for a Canadian measure excluding their participation in an AAU market.

GATT Article XXIII states that:
I f any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreem ent is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment o f
any objective o f the Agreem ent is being im peded as a result o f ...
b) the application by another contracting party o f any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions o f this A greem ent...
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment o f the matter, make
written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it
considers to be concerned....
G ATS Article X X III(3) states that:
I f any M ember considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to accrue to
it under a specific com m itm ent o f another M ember under Part III o f this Agreement is
being nullified or impaired as a result o f the application o f any measure which does not
conflict with the provisions o f this Agreem ent, it m ay have the recourse to the D S U ...
G A T T Article XXIII(2)

GATS Article XXIII(3)
James P. Durling, and Sim on N. Lester, O riginal M eanings an d the Film D ispute: The D rafting H istoiy,
Textual Evolution, a n d A pplication o f the N on-violation N ullification o r Im pairm ent Remedy, 32 George
W ashington Journal o f International Law and Econom ics 2 1 1 at 240
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Two requirements must be met for a GATT Article XXIII complaint to be f i l e d . F i r s t ,
“the measure in question cannot have reasonably been anticipated by the complaining
party at the time the concession was negotiated.” ’’* Second, “the measure in question
must have damaged the competitive position o f the imported product concerned.” '”

The U.S. will likely be able to meet the second requirement, because it is likely
that the market value o f U.S. created AAUs will be very dependent on access to, and
verification under, the Kyoto Protocol emissions trading system. Furthermore, past
disputes under this issue have demonstrated^” that a party need not prove definitive
changes in trade flow before and after a measure was instituted. A party need merely
prove that an “abstract adverse change in competition”^” has occurred. One author
argues that GATT/GATS Articles XXIII provide a “panacea” for invalid complaints."’^
Although the laws and drafting o f history may dictate a strict correlation between result
and causation, the panels have not always interpreted the law in accordance with this
standard.^’^ The method by which a WTO dispute resolution panel analyzed and ruled on
such issues is exemplified in the following landmark case involving a film manufacturing
industry in Japan.

i) Fuji / Kodak Case

See Sung-joon Cho, G ATT N on-V iolation Issues in the WTO Fram ework: A re they the A chilles ’ H eel o f
the D isp u te Settlem ent P rocess, 39 Harvard International Law Journal 311 (1998) at 316
id. at 316
id. at 317
Treatm ent b y G erm any o f Im ports o f Sardines, October 31, 1952. GATT B .l.S .D . (1953)
su pra note 196 at 318

at 324
See Durling supra note 196 at 250
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In 1995, the U.S. filed a complaint against Japan regarding the Japanese film
manufacturing market. The U.S. contended that even if Japan had not violated any o f the
GATT provisions, some benefits to the U.S. as a GATT 1994 Member was nonetheless
nullified or impaired. The U.S. claimed that Japan had performed actions to: 1) Create an
exclusive distribution sector; 2) Restrict the growth o f large stores; and 3) Restrict the use
o f sales promotions.^^'^ The panel eventually found the U.S. claims unfounded because
the U.S. could not prove that the measures caused any nullification or impairment.
However, this panel’s four step analysis o f GATT Article XXIII is noteworthy because it
set guidelines for future panels on how to interpret this Article.

a) ActionableMeasure
First, the panel looked at the issue of what constitutes an actionable
“measure” under Article XXIII. It clarified that the scope o f a “measure” was
greater than merely a ‘subsidy’ and could include virtually any type o f
government measure. In fact, it went so far as to allow for actions originating in
the private sector that are actually “quasi-govemmental” in nature.^®^

b) Reasonable Anticipation of Benefits
Next, the panel analyzed what it means for a benefit to be “reasonably
anticipated.” It ruled, in accordance with past GATT panels,^®^ that for benefits
accruing from a measure to be legitimate, the challenged measure must not have
been “reasonably anticipated” at the time that the tariff concession was
id. at 260
id at 263
^

at 263
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negotiated. Furthermore, the panel noted that in order for a measure to be
“reasonably anticipated” the measure must have been introduced prior to the
closing of the most recent round of tariff negotiations. However, not all cases are
linked to tariff concessions. These types o f cases are called “independent mode”
cases, for which there is little history on how to base correct interpretation o f this
standard.

c) Nullification or Impairment as a Result o f the Measure
Thirdly, the Panel examined the relationship between the alleged
“nullification or impairment” and the applied measure in question. The Panel
stated that it is imperative for the measure to have made more than a “de
minimis

contribution to the alleged nullification or impairment. In making

this decision the panel set a fairly loose standard o f causation.

d) Detailed Justification Standard
Lastly, the Panel examined the evidentiary standard which a Party must
meet to show injury. Past Panels had used the “detailed justification standard,”
requiring a Party to show “detailed justification” that the measure has caused
nullification or impairment o f a reasonably anticipated benefit. The Panel veered
from this interpretation and accepted U.S. claims that “detailed justification” was
solely a pleading requirement rather than an evidentiary standard.^^^

207

For a more detailed discussion o f “independent mode" cases see Cho supra note 197 at 323-326
See Durling supra note 196 at 265

For a detailed legal analysis describing w hy the Panel was incorrect in this interpretation See Durling
supra note 196 at 268
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If future Panel decisions follow the lead o f the Fuji-Kodak Panel the U.S. will
potentially feel justified in bringing a nullification or impairment suit before a WTO
panel. Based on the four part analysis detailed above, it is likely that a measure
restricting market access to a Canadian emissions trading market will constitute an
actionable measure under GATT/GATS Article XXIII. It is also likely that there will be
an economic impairment to the U.S. emissions trading market if the U.S. is not allowed
access. Thirdly, if “detailed justification” is interpreted as solely a procedural pleading
requirement, it should not be a difficult hurdle to overcome. Lastly, because of the lack of
case law dictating guidelines for interpretation in “independent mode” cases,^'° the
question o f whether the U.S. is justified in reasonably anticipating benefits from
Canadian emissions trading system is difficult to ascertain. It would seem that based on
the market access provisions in the GATS and the Nation o f Origin provisions under the
GATT, the U.S. would be justified in anticipating the benefits o f market access to this
trading system. However, without legal precedent on which to base this analysis,
comment here would be purely speculative.

B. Non-Violation

There are two pathways by which a Canadian sanction on U.S. derived AAUs
would withstand a GATT/GATS or NAFTA challenge. The first of these pathways is if
the sanction is found to be consistent with Canada’s obligations under the GATT/GATS
and/or the NAFTA. Specifically, the sanction would have to be consistent with the most
210

i.e. one not involving tariff concessions
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favored nation and national treatment principles o f these agreements. The second way in
which the sanction could withstand a GATT/GATS and/or NAFTA challenge is if AAUs
were determined to be out o f the scope o f these agreements. This would be the case if
AAUs were determined to be neither goods nor services, and therefore trade in these
entities would not be subject to Member obligations under these agreements. These two
alternatives will be discussed in the following sections.

1. MFN and National Treatment Principles

The WTO Asbestos Appellate Body decision^"' reflects a landmark decision in its
ruling for the first time that a unilateral sanction excluding certain products from the
French market, did not violate the most favored nation or national treatment principles.^
As discussed above, the Appellate Body focused on the term “like product,” and reached
the conclusion that asbestos products manufactured in Canada were not “like products” to
the substitute products manufactured in France. The WTO defines the term “like product”
as “a product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product under
consideration or, in the absence o f such a product which, although not alike in all
respects, has characteristics closely resembling those o f the product under
consideration.”^'^ The Appellate Body classified “like products” based on the following

■' ' A s discussed in Section IV (A )(4) above
The m ost favored nation principle states that no contracting Party shall procure:
any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity, granted by any contracting party to an
product originating in .. .any other country shall be accorded im m ediately and
unconditionally to the like products originating...in all other contracting parties.
The national treatment principle states that no contracting Party shall :
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that to like products o f national origin in
^
respect to all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their internal sale.
w w w .w to.org Found 5/26/02
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criteria: 1) physical properties o f the products; 2) the end uses o f the product; 3)
consumers’ tastes and habits; 4) tariff classification; and (5) the risk associated with the
product?''^ It is possible that through similar analysis Canadian and U.S. created AAUs
also be found not “like products.”

i) Physical Properties o f AAUs

If AAUs are classified as products, the physical properties o f AAUs created in the
U.S. versus those created in Canada will remain virtually identical. One cannot
distinguish between carbon emissions on a physical basis, therefore this point will not
likely carry any weight in establishing a significant difference between AAUs created in
Canada versus those created in the U.S.

ii) End Uses o f AA Us

The end uses of AAUs created in the U.S., in contrast to those created in Canada,
provide a platform to argue that these products/services are “like.” AAUs created in
Canada, or any other Kyoto Protocol member nation, will be used to meet emission
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Even if Canada is forced to accept AAUs
created in the U.S., or any other non-Kyoto Protocol member nation, into a Canadian
market these AAUs will likely not be permitted for use to meet these obligations.
Therefore, the end uses o f these two products/services are fundamentally disparate.

214

su pra note 139
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ni) Consumer Tastes and Habits
Consumer tastes and habits also provide a platform on which to argue that AAUs
created in the U.S. and Canada are not “like” products/services. Based on the author’s
experience brokering emission reduction credits domestically in the U.S., there are two
major issues governing consumer tastes and habits with respect to purchasing emission
reduction credits. The first concern consumer’s have is; will the appropriate regulatory
body recognize the credits for the purposes o f compliance with appropriate regulations?
Consumers will likely prefer to purchase AAUs that are certain to be recognized by the
Canadian government. Furthermore, when the Canadian government is the consumer, it
is even more likely that the consumer will prefer to purchase AAUs that can be used to
meet Canadian obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The second concern consumers
often have with respect to purchase o f emission reduction credits is the price o f the
credits. AAUs created in the U.S. would likely cost less because o f the associated risk
that the credits may not be recognized by the Canadian government. However, because
o f the cost associated with creating emission reduction credits, this price differential will
likely not be enough to override the risk factor. Therefore, consumer tastes and habits
may indicate that U.S. and Canadian created AAUs are not “like” products/services.

iv) Tariff Classification o f AA Us

For all intents and purposes, apart from meeting obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol, all AAUs are identical. Therefore, this paper will assume that AAUs created in
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the U.S. and those created in Canada will be similarly classified with respect to tariffs.
Under this assumption, tariff classification does not support the argument.

v) Risk Associated With Use o f AA Us

As discussed above, in conjunction with ‘consumer tastes and habits,’ the primary
risk associated with the use o f U.S. created AAUs is that the credits will not be
recognized by the Canadian government for the purposes of compliance with domestic
and/or international obligations. If consumers purchase credits that cannot be used for
compliance, they face the risk o f economic loss through penalties and/or the necessity to
purchase valid credits that can be used for compliance. The Asbestos Appellate Body
decided that a French ban on Canadian asbestos products was justified because the
Canadian product had an associated health risk. In the case o f a Canadian ban on U.S.
created AAUs, the risk is economic, not health related.

If by the reasoning above, AAUs created in non-Kyoto Protocol member nations
are not considered “like” products/services to those created within a Kyoto Protocol
member nation, trade in AAUs will likely fall outside the scope o f the GATT, the GATS,
and the NAFTA national treatment and most favored nation principles. Therefore, if a
U.S. created quantified emission reduction is not a “like” product/service to a Kyoto
Protocol approved AAU, it would likely not be subject to equal treatment under NAFTA,
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which prohibits quantitative restrictions on “like, directly competitive, or substitutable
products” from member nations.^

2. AAUs: Not Within the Scope of the WTO or NAFTA

Although the literature on this topic is sparse, those who have written on
the topic of AAU classification^'^ find it very possible that AAUs will not be
considered neither “goods” nor “services” under the WTO or the NAFTA. The
UNCTAD suggests that the WTO may view AAUs as neither goods nor services
because AAUs “exist by virtue o f an international agreement and their sole use is
for meeting sovereign obligations under that agreement.”^'^ Under this scenario,
restricting trade in AAUs to Kyoto Protocol member nations would not be subject
to WTO or NAFTA rules. However, these authors also recognize that “in the
absence of a WTO ruling, the risk remains that WTO rules apply [to trade in
AAUs].”^'^

AAUs represent a completely new “commodity,” which could

warrant a completely new category of classification under the WTO and/or the
NAFTA. Furthermore, since AAUs are proving so difficult to classify, this
uncertainty could leave room for a politically motivated decision, one therefore
even more difficult to predict.

Pursuant to N A F T A Chapter III A rticles 301,302 and 309
See W erksman, Petsonk, Parker, A m in et.al., and U N C T A D
S ee U N C T A D su pra note 22 at 63
U N C T A D supra note 22 at 63
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VII. Can the NAAEC Protect Canadian Climate Change Policy?

With regard to a potential NAFTA conflict between Canada and the U.S.
(or Mexico) over AAU trading, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC) may hold the solution. The NAAEC requires that NAFTA
member nations enforce and improve their environmental standards and policies.
Under these requirements, Canada may be able to institute domestic policy
restrictions on trade in AAUs so long as the policy is clearly designed to protect
the environment. The NAAEC protects domestic environmental legislation.
Therefore, it probably does not matter if AAUs are classified as “products” or
“services.”

The NAAEC may offer protection for Canada if the trade restrictions
embedded in the Kyoto Protocol"” come under attack by non-Kyoto Protocol
parties that are member to the NAFTA.""*’ The following section will provide a
detailed description o f the environmental protection measures provided for in the
NAAEC, discuss the process by which those environmental protection measures
can be enforced, and finally discuss how Canada may be able to use this
agreement to justify domestic implementation of the trade restrictions mandated
by the Kyoto Protocol.

A. NAAEC: Environmental Protection Provisions
i.e. restrictions on trade in ERUs, A A U s, CERs, and R M U s to K yoto Protocol Party nations
N ote, the W TO does not have a congruent agreement to the N A A E C , therefore this argument applies
only non-com pliance charges brought forth by the U .S. or M exico.
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As discussed in Section 11(C)(3) above, the NAAEC was negotiated by the
Clinton Administration to gain political support for the passage of the NAFTA.
The NAAEC clearly sets the stage for the pro-environmental protection
standpoint detailed in the preamble o f the Agreement. The NAAEC contains
measures allowing for the: (1) enhancement o f domestic environmental policies;
(2) investigation o f charges involving inadequate enforcement o f domestic
environmental policies; (3) arbitration o f environmental disputes; and (4)
sanctioning of members found to be in violation o f NAAEC requirements.^^'
Additionally, the NAAEC established a new body known as the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) to ensure that the NAAEC
requirements are met, and to handle dispute resolution under these requirements.
The specific stipulations are cited below.

•

NAAEC Preamble

The preamble emphasizes the importance o f sustainable development and
intergenerational equity to the protection of the environment. It links the
importance of environmental protection to sustained economic growth.

The

preamble stresses the “importance o f the conservation, protection,

and

enhancement of the environment,” as well as the “essential role o f cooperation
[among parties] in achieving sustainable development for the well-being of

D avid S. Baron, NAFTA- M aking the Side A greem ent Work, 12 Arizona Journal o f International and
Comparative Law 603 (1995)
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present and future g e n e r a t i o n s .T h e s e statements do not equivocate in their
purpose of environmental protection.

•

Enforcement o f Domestic Environmental Policy

The NAAEC goes on to state specifically that all member nations must
“enhance compliance with, and enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations.”^^^ Additionally, ‘interested persons’ have the right to request action
in response to a violation of this stipulation by instigating administrative, quasi
judicial, or judicial proceedings.^^'* Again, as in the preamble, the text is clearly
biased towards protection o f national sovereignty in the case of domestic
environmental policy.

•

Enhancement o f Domestic Environmental Policy

The NAAEC not only requires that member nations effectively enforce
their environmental policies already in place, but also uses the harmonization
principle to require member nations to improve on these policies. Harmonization
ensures that the country with the least stringent environmental protection
regulations does not become the common denominator. The NAAEC states that
members must “foster the protection and improvement of the environment,” they

su pra note 63 a t preamble
su pra note 63 at Article 1(g)
Sandra Le Priol-Vrejan, The NAFTA Environm ental Side A greem ent and the P o w er to Investigate
Violations o f Environm ental Laws, 23 Hofstra Law R eview 483 (1994)
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must “better conserve, protect, and enhance the environment,” they must “ensure
that its laws and regulations provide for a high level o f environmental protection,
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.” Additionally,
each Party must “effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations
through appropriate governmental action.”

•

Creation o f the CEC

Central to the NAAEC is the creation o f the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC).

Among other duties, the CEC provides a forum through

which Parties, individuals, or NGOs, can resolve disputes surrounding a Party’s
failure to enforce its environmental regulations.

•

Arbitration on Environmental Disputes

When disputes arise surrounding the requirements of the NAAEC, any
Party may commence formal consultation with any other Party accused o f being
in violation. If Parties are unable to reach resolution through this consultation
process, the Council can choose to defer the issue to a five member arbitral
Panel.^^^ This process will be discussed in more detail in Section VI(C) below.

su pra note 63 at. Article 1(a), (c). Article 3, and Article 5
Each Party involved in the dispute chooses two o f the five panelists from an existing list prepared by the
Council, The fifth panelist, the Chair, is agreed upon by both Parties or else chosen for the Parties by a
third uninvolved party. See su pra note 198 at 606.
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B. Options for Enforcement: Potential for Protection

Based on the requirements described above, the NAAEC may permit for
Canada to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and incorporate its policies into Canadian law
without breaching its NAFTA obligations. This could happen in one of two ways.
First, NAAEC rules allowing for the improvement o f environmental regulations
among member nations may be employed to justify the rules contained in the
Kyoto Protocol. Second, the NAAEC rules requiring member nations to enforce
their environmental regulations may be employed to uphold the rules contained in
the Kyoto Protocol. Each of these arguments will be explored below.

The NAAEC permits member nations to improve their domestic
environmental policy. The Kyoto Protocol is indeed a policy designed to protect
and improve the quality o f the e n v iro n m e n t.T h e re fo re , if Canada chooses to
adopt and incorporate the Protocol into its own legislation, the trade measures
included therein may be protected by NAAEC Articles 1(a), 1(c), 3, and 5^^
allowing for improvement o f environmental regulations.

The CEC can only hear cases related to the failure of a member
government to enforce its environmental regulations. Therefore, if the Canadian
government chooses to accept U.S. derived AAUs in hopes of avoiding such a

See discussion in Section 11(A) above.
A dditionally, Article 2(1) requires that each Party shall “promote the use o f econom ic instruments for
the efficient achievem ent o f environmental goals.” This may provide safe harbor for the use o f an
international em issions trading system.

85
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

U.S. challenge, any resident or resident organization o f Canada, the U.S., or
Mexico may be in a position to challenge this decision. Any such party could
claim that Canada would not be enforcing its environmental policies as dictated
by the Kyoto Protocol in allowing U.S. derived AAUs into the Canadian market.
Article V o f the Kyoto Protocol specifies that AAUs can be transferred among
Kyoto Protocol Party nations;

Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount,
which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned
amount for the acquiring Party...
Any emission reduction units, or part of an assigned amount,
which a Party acquires transfers to another Party in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be subtracted from the
assigned amount for the transferring Party.

Furthermore, Article 17 o f the Kyoto Protocol stipulates:

Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading
for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any
such trading [emphasis added] shall be supplemental to domestic actions
for the purposes of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments under that Article.

These statements can be interpreted in one o f two ways. On the one hand, if the
U.S. is not a Kyoto Protocol member nation, engaging in international emissions
trading as defined by the Kyoto Protocol will clearly not be “supplemental to
domestic actions for the purposes of meeting...commitments under” Article 3.
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Therefore, it can be inferred that by engaging in emissions trading with the United
States, Canada would be engaging in an illegal trade as defined by the Kyoto
Protocol. On the other hand, although the Kyoto Protocol explicitly states who a
Party nation can trade with, it does not necessarily state who a Party cannot trade
with. Articles 3 and 6 of the Kyoto Protocol state the following:

Article 3

10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned
amount, which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance
with the provisions o f Article 6 or o f Article 17 shall be added to
the

assigned

amount

for

the

acquiring

Party.

11. Any emission reduction units, or any part o f an assigned
amount, which a Party transfers to another Party in accordance
with the provisions of Article 6 or o f Article 17 shall be subtracted
from the assigned amount for the transferring Party.

In addition, Article 6 states as follows:

Article 6
1. For the purpose o f meeting its commitments under Article 3, any
Party included in Annex 1““^ may transfer to, or acquire from, any
other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects
229

A nnex I o f the UNFCCC generally corresponds to A nnex B o f the Kyoto Protocol
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aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or
enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in
any sector o f the economy, provided that:
(a) Any such project has the approval o f the Parties involved;
(b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources,
or an enhancement o f removals by sinks, that is additional to any
that would otherwise occur;
(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in
compliance with its obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and
(d) The acquisition o f emission reduction units shall be
supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes o f meeting
commitments under Article 3.

Article 3 clearly stated that a Party can account for ERUs or AAUs acquired from,
or transferred to, another Party. However, Article 3 does not state that a Party may
not account for ERUs or AAUs acquired from, or transferred to, a non-Party.
Similarly, Article 6 stipulates that Parties may acquire or transfer ERUs resulting
from ‘projects’ from any other Party. Again, it does not stipulate that Party
nations may not engage in such actions with non-Parties. Articles 6 (c) and (d)
stipulate that in order to participate in this process, Parties must comply with
Articles 5 and 7, and also that any such actions must be supplemental to domestic
actions. However, because the U.S. will presumably not be a Party to the Kyoto
Protocol, it is not bound by these rules.
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Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol does not hold Parties responsible for the
compliance obligations o f their trading partners.

Therefore, since neither the

Kyoto Protocol, nor the Marrakesh Accords specifically prohibit Party nations
from trading with non-Party nations,

Canada’s obtaining AAUs from the U.S.

may not be seen as an example o f a failure to enforce Canadian environmental
regulations.

In any event, this challenge may allege the failure of a NAFTA

member government to enforce its environmental laws and under these
circumstances would therefore be heard by the CEC. The process involved in
such a hearing is described below.

C. Dispute Resolution Under the CEC: Process and Procedures

Dispute resolution surrounding a NAFTA member nation’s failure to
enforce its environmental regulations is handled exclusively by the CEC. The
CEC is made up o f a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory
Committee (JPAC). The Council is the governing body, the Secretariat is the
administrative body, and the JPAC is a public advisory body to the two
aforementioned groups.’^®

As mentioned above. Article 14 o f the NAAEC is unique in that it grants
standing to public citizens and non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) to file
complaints against the government o f any member nation for the 1after’s alleged
230

supra note 221 at 606
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failure to enforce its environmental regulations. Public citizens and NGOs must
submit a complaint to the Secretariat detailing how the accused party has failed to
enforce its environmental laws effectively. Complainants must meet a number of
procedural requirements for a submission to the Secretariat to be approved and
reviewed.^^' If these requirements are met, the Secretariat may then decide to
dismiss the complaint, or request a response from the Party in violation.^^^ In
making this decision, the Secretariat must examine and “be guided by”^^^ the
following criteria: (1 ) the party submitting the complaint must allege harm; (2) the
submission must raise issues that will further the purposes o f the Side Agreement;
(3) private remedies under the Party’s law must have been previously pursued;
and (4) the submission must be drawn exclusively from mass media reports.^^"^

Based on the requirements described above, it is likely that the Secretariat
will be justified in requesting a response from the Canadian government if a
complaint is filed due to Canada’s failure to enforce the requirements o f the
Kyoto P ro to c o l.S u b se q u e n tly , the Secretariat may seek approval from the
Council to file a “factual record” to document the allegations. Alternatively, the
Secretariat may choose to dismiss the complaint if certain criteria are not met.

For a list o f these requirements see su pra note 221 at 607 Additionally, for an excellent discussion o f
the entire dispute resolution system under the N A A E C see John K nox, A N ew A pproach to C om pliance
with Internationa! Environm ental Law: The Subm issions P ro ced u re o f the NAFTA E nvironm ental
C om m ission, 28 E cology Law Quarterly 1 (2001)
If a complaint is initiated b y a N A F T A Party, an individual or an NGO, the CEC has limited
powers o f investigation. H ow ever, the scope o f the C EC 's investigative powers is unclear in that
the N A A E C does not sp ecify what materials the CEC m ay request from a Party nor does it dictate
that the m em ber Party must surrender such materials when requested. See supra note 184 at 500
supi'a note 63 at Article 14.2
^ supi-a note 63 Article 14.2
If those requirements are implem ented dom estically by statute.
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For example, the Secretariat may dismiss a claim if the failure to enforce an
environmental law^^^ reflects “a reasonable exercise o f official discretion in
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, or compliance m a t t e r s . T h e Secretariat
may also dismiss a charge if it relates to occupational safety and health laws or to
laws primarily aimed at the management of natural resources.^^* Additionally, the
Secretariat has refijsed to permit Article 14 submissions challenging any
legislative action that diminishes environmental law enforcement.^^^

If the

creation o f a “factual record” is approved by the Council,^"*® it may lead to further
investigation by the Secretariat, comment by the Parties involved,^*^' and
potentially the public release of the “factual record” if such a release is approved

Article 25(2){b) o f the N A A E C defines an environmental law as any law whose:
primary p u rp ose... is the protection o f the environm ent, or the prevention o f a danger to human life or health,
through,
(i)
the prevention, abatem ent, or control o f the release, discharge, or em ission o f pollutants or
environm ental contam inanats,
(ii)
the control o f environm entall hazardous or toxic ch em icals, substances, materials, and wates, and the
dissem ination o f inform ation related thereto, or
(iii)
the protection o f w ild flora or fauna, including endangered sp ecies, their habitat, and specially
protected natural a reas...

supra note 43 at 211. For additional discussion o f the criteria see supra note 66 at 608
supra note 43 at 211. This stipulation raises an interesting rift betw een the N A A E C and the general
exem ptions o f N A FT A Chapter 21. The N A FT A Chapter 21 exem ptions require that in order for an
exem ption to be invoked, the measure in question must be primarily aim ed at the conservation o f a natural
resource. In contrast, the N A A E C stipulated the opposite, it’s ‘exem ptions’ may be dism issed in cases
where the law in question is related to the management o f a natural resource. Therefore, it m ay be the case
that because o f this difference in verbiage, arguments related to N A A E C ‘exem ptions’ could not be used in
conjunction with arguments citing the provisions o f the N A F T A Chapter 21 exem ptions to build a case
protecting Canadian im plem entation o f the K yoto Protocol. In other words, in it’s defense to a U .S.
challenge under N A F T A , Canada m ay not be able to argue protection under the N A A E C as w ell as under
Chapter 21 for dom estic p olicy aimed at environmental protection. Canada would be forced to chose to
argue either that the K yoto Protocol w as a law designed to protect natural resource under Chapter 21, or
that the K yoto Protocol is not primarily aim ed at the management o f natural resources and thereby fair
gam e to be heard by the N A A E C .
su pra note 43 at 212. For exam ples o f dism issed cases based on this criteria see SEM -95-001 and
SE M -95-002. In these cases the CEC dism issed charges challenging Canadian suspension o f enforcement
o f the U .S. Endangered Species A ct and the elim ination o f private sector remedies to review U .S. salvage
logging sales.
The N A A E C does not provide guidelines under w hich the Council must make it’s decision as to this
matter.
The Secretariat maintains discretion over whether or not to incorporate these com m ents into the final
document. See supra note 61 at Article 15(6).
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by the Council.^"^^ However, in the case o f a citizen or NGO challenge o f a
member nation’s failure to enforce environmental policy, this release o f
information is the only “sanction” available against the party at fault.^'’^
Additionally, as the name implies, the “factual record” is simply a statement of
facts involved in the case, and does not issue any binding ruling ordering the
Party at fault to enforce their environmental regulations effectively. Some authors
argue that the ability o f the CEC to function effectively as a regulatory body is
severely limited.

IIX. Alternative Potential for Trade Conflict
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the classification of AAUs, there are
other aspects of the Kyoto Protocol which may lead Parties to take actions in
conflict with their WTO or NAFTA obligations. Each Party will be responsible
for the allocation o f allowances or permits domestically. Depending on the
method o f allocation in each member nation, it is possible that the allocation of
allowances or emission permits may conflict with member obligations under these
trade agreements. Additionally, the manner in which countries enforce permit
requirements could potentially conflict with NAFTA and/or WTO obligations.
These two scenarios are described below.

A s o f the publication o f Knox supra note 190 (2001), the Council had only permitted the public release
o f two factual records.
su pra note 43 at 214. There are how ever additional sanctions available as a result o f the N A AEC arbitral
process. Under this process, the governm ent o f any member nation m ay request the establishment o f an
arbitral panel to hear a dispute concerning any other member nations' “persistent pattern o f failure” to
enforce it’s environmental laws. I f a Party is found guilty o f this charge monetary penalties may be
im posed on the offending Party.
su pra note 224
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A. Allocation and Enforcement
If allocation of AAUs are made in such a way as to constitute an
‘actionable subsidy’^"*^ or a ‘regulatory measure that confers financial benefit,’ the
Party may violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. This Agreement prohibits government subsidies with very few
exemptions.^'^^ The UNCTAD has indicated that if allowances are allocated to
certain entities in such a way as to confer a surplus (i.e. in excess to what is
needed for operation), this surplus m ay be construed as a ‘financial contribution’
from the government, and therefore potentially in violation of the Agreement.^"^^

Alternatively, a Party may find itself in violation of WTO and/or NAFTA
rules depending on where it decides to impose the ‘point of enforcement.’
Broadly speaking, Parties have three choices with respect to the ‘point of
enforcement.’ They can require surrender o f allowances (1) upstream, at the point
of fossil fuel extraction, sale or transport; (2) downstream, at the point o f emission
or; (3) utilize a hybrid o f these two systems.

UNCTAD has indicated that if

The W TO Subsidies Agreem ent defines an ‘actionable subsidy’ as ‘(1) a non-c?é’ minimus ‘financial
contribution’ that (2) is bestow ed on ‘sp ecific’ enterprises or industries; and (3) causes or threatens ‘injury’
or ‘serious prejudice’ to foreign manufacturers or like products” See Richard R. Parker, D esigns f o r
D om estic Carbon E m issions Trading: C om m ents on WTO A spects. The H. John H einz Center for Science,
E conom ics, and the Environment, June 1990 at 2 Parker explains that a non- de minimus financial
contribution is one that yields a benefit, directly or indirectly, that is greater than one percent o f the
receiving firm’s total sales o f all products or, if the subsidy is limited to certain products, one percent o f the
firm ’s total sales o f the subsidized products.
A prohibited subsidy is defined in the agreement as a ‘‘financial contribution that confers a benefit on a
specific enterprise or industry or group o f enterprises or industries” (U N C TA D supra note 22 at 63)
For a more detailed discussion o f this issue see supra note 22 at 64
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allowances for fossil fuels are demanded upstream, or ‘at the border,’ this may
account for a quantitative restriction on trade

248

Additionally, this scenario raises the question o f how to allow market
access to non-Kyoto Protocol Party exporters; and how non-Parties can acquire
and account for AAUs required for surrender at the border. If AAU surrender is
required at the border, and non-Kyoto Protocol Parties are not allowed market
access, Kyoto Protocol Parties can only trade in energy related goods and services
(i.e. fossil fuels) with other Kyoto Protocol Parties. It is very likely that under this
scenario Parties would be in conflict with their obligations under the GATT, the
GATS, or the NAFTA.

On the other hand, if non-Parties are allowed market

access, it is unclear whether they also create AAUs domestically and trade them
on the open market. If so, this will create a huge disincentive for countries to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Under this scenario, non-Parties can reap the economic
benefits of an emissions trading system without the economic hardship associated
with fulfilling other Kyoto Protocol emission reduction requirements.

The second alternative, downstream surrender, is more likely avoid WTO
and/or NAFTA conflicts. However this approach limits the scope of total carbon
emissions covered. This system can only cover approximately half o f all carbon

This argument would obviously only apply if A A U s are classified as goods or services and therefore
subject to N A F T A requirements.
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emissions.^'^^ Mobile sources, such as private passenger vehicles, are difficult to
regulate and would likely fall outside of the extent of coverage.

The third model, the hybrid system, combines various aspects of the two
aforementioned systems. The hybrid system is similar to a downstream approach
in that utilities and large industrial sources are required to hold allowances to
account for their emissions.

However, the hybrid system borrows from the

upstream approach in that domestic fuel distributors must also hold allowances
for small fuel users such as private passenger vehicles."^^ The idea behind this
approach is that fuel distributors will pass the cost associated with holding
allowances onto the consumer/emission source by raising gas prices, thereby
pressuring consumers to switch to less carbon intensive fuel sources?^' Although
the hybrid system incorporates aspects o f the upstream system, it diminishes the
need for quantitative control ‘at the border.’ Therefore, this system is less likely to
come into conflict with GATT obligations.

Additionally, by requiring fuel

suppliers to hold allowances this system is far more inclusive of the entire scope
o f carbon emissions.

Supra note 22 at 78
This system would also fall short o f accounting for cross border traffic, i.e. passenger vehicles buying
gasoline in the U.S. and driving into Canada.
See Zhong X iang Zhang, G reenhouse Gas E m issions Trading a n d the W orld Trading System, 32(5)
Journal o f W orld Trade 219 (1998)
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IX. Conclusions

Given the lack o f precedent, it is difficult to determine with any degree o f
certainty how the WTO or the NAFTA may classify AAUs. Some analysts may
argue that because the trade restrictions under other ME As such as the Montreal
Protocol, the Basel Convention and CITES have not been challenged, it is
unlikely that a similar challenge will arise under the Kyoto Protocol. However,
because the potential economic impact associated with the Kyoto Protocol is far
greater than that associated with any o f its predecessor MEAs, it is likely to attract
more attention from the international community.

Therefore, it is prudent to

analyze all possible grounds for conflict with existing trade agreements and
prepare for such conflicts before they arise.

Specifically, it is imperative that negotiations be held between the U.S.
and Canada with the intention o f placing the Kyoto Protocol on the list of
exempted MEAs in NAFTA Chapter 1, Article 104.

Some may argue that

because the U.S. is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, it will not be willing to
exempt the Kyoto Protocol from NAFTA obligations. However, the U.S. has
agreed to exempt other MEAs, such as the Basel Convention, from NAFTA
obligations to which the U.S. is also a non-party. Nevertheless, the U.S. will
likely reject such an exemption based on its interest in taking part in the
international emissions trading market. The Bush Alternative to the Kyoto
Protocol is an indication of such an interest. It seems that the creation o f the
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alternative agreement was not only an effort to save face in front o f the
international community but also an attempt to participate in an economically
viable emissions trading market. It is possible that this half hearted attempt at a
national alternative may provide access to an international emissions trading
market.^^^ In fact,a pilot project called the Chicago Climate Exchange is already
underway establishing a domestic greenhouse gas market with hopes of
eventually expanding to international trade.

Lastly, albeit not ideal, if non-Kyoto Protocol member nations with
domestic trading systems comparable to those contained in the Kyoto Protocol are
simply allowed market access, it is possible that NAFTA and/or WTO challenge
may be avoided altogether. However, currently there does not exist a comparable
system with legally binging emissions reduction commitments. If the U.S.
establishes a parallel trading system and attempts to take part in the emissions
trading system established under the Kyoto Protocol without committing to
legally binding emission reduction targets, it is likely that member nations will
strongly oppose such an action. One author argues however, that ‘real’ emission
reductions created in non-Kyoto Protocol party nations are preferable, from an
environmental standpoint, to ‘hot air’ credits.*^^ Additionally, this author argues
that by allowing U.S. participation in the market, lower cost credits created in the
U.S. would drive down the price o f AAUs to make them more accessible to

This option may provide the U .S. with the argument for an option which is “less inconsistent" with
M em ber obligations under the N A FTA and the WTO.
Som e authors predict that without U .S. participation, the em issions trading market will largely be based
on “hot air.” See Hagen, Cathrine et. al., From Sm all to Insignificant: Clim ate Im pact o f the K yoto
P ro to c o l with and w ithout U.S., Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, at 5
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European companies.^^'* Some suggest that even in the absence o f binding
commitments, it is likely that based on “expectations regarding future regulatory
requirements,” U.S. emissions in 2010 may be lower than its normal baseline.^^^
Others warn o f the danger o f double counting and/or overselling if multiple
trading systems attempt to overlap."^^

The question o f whether Canada will be forced to allow non-Kyoto
Protocol nations that are Party to WTO and/or NAFTA, market access to the
Canadian greenhouse gas emissions trading system is very difficult to answer.
Many factors require consideration, and there are no concrete legal guidelines to
answer the question. This paper has attempted to show some potential scenarios
under which Canada may come into conflict with its obligations under the WTO
and NAFTA by restricting market access to the U.S. (or any other NAFTA or
WTO member nation).

Additionally, this paper has suggested some harbors

which may provide protection for Canada from a WTO and/or NAFTA challenge.
Once the WTO has officially classified AAUs, or rejected them from the trading
system, this discussion can be markedly more pointed, or perhaps not necessary at
all. However, in the meantime, it provides an interesting and relevant point of
discussion, as well as highlights some o f the inconsistencies and weaknesses of
the system designed to address AAUs.

See Diringir at 2
See Manne, Alan et. al., U.S. R ejection o f the K yo to P rotocol: The Im pact on C om pliance C osts and
C O : Em issions, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (2001)
See Nordhaus, Robert, et. al.. International Em issions Trading Rules as a C om pliance Tool: lllta t is
N ecessary. Effective, a n d W orkable? Environmental Law Reporter (2000)
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Appendix A

Annex B Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria*
Canada
Croatia*
Czech Republic*
Denmark
Estonia*
European Community
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary*
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia*
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Liechtenstein
Lithuania*
Luxembourg
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland*
Portugal
Romania*
Russian Federation*
Slovakia*
Slovenia*
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine*
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States o f America

* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
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Appendix B

GATS Annex on Financial Services
1. Scope and Definition
(a) This Annex applies to measures affecting the supply of
financial services. Reference to the supply o f a financial
service in this Annex shall mean the supply o f a service as
defined in paragraph 2 o f Article 1 o f the Agreement.
(b) For the purposes of subparagraph 3(b) of Article I of the
Agreement, "services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority” means the following:
(i) activities conducted by a central bank or monetary authority
or by any other public entity in pursuit of monetary or exchange
rate policies;
(ii) activities forming part of a statutory system of social
security or public retirem ent plans; and
(iii) other activities conducted by a public entity for the
account or with the guarantee or using the financial resources
of the Government.
(c) For the purposes of subparagraph 3(b) of Article I of the
Agreement, if a Member allows any of the activities referred to
in subparagraphs (b) (ii) or (b) (iii) of this paragraph to be
conducted by its financial service suppliers in competition with
a public entity or a financial service supplier, "services” shall
include such activities.
(d) Subparagraph 3(c) of Article I of the Agreement shall not
apply to services covered by this Annex.

2. Domestic Regulation
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a
Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for
prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors,
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is
owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity
and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do
not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall
not be used as a means of avoiding the Member's commitments
or obligations under the Agreement.
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(b) Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to require a
Member to disclose information relating to the affairs and
accounts of individual customers or any confidential or
proprietary information in the possession of public entities.

3. Regulation
(a) A Member may recognize prudential measures of any other
country in determining how the Member's measures relating to
financial services shall be applied. Such recognition, which may
be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, may be based
upon an agreement or arrangement with the country concerned
or may be accorded autonomously.
(b) A Member th at is a party to such an agreement or
arrangement referred to in subparagraph (a) , whether future
or existing, shall afford adequate opportunity for other
interested Members to negotiate their accession to such
agreements or arrangements, or to negotiate comparable ones
with it, under circumstances in which there would be
equivalent regulation, oversight, implementation of such
regulation, and, if appropriate, procedures concerning the
sharing of information between the parties to the agreement or
arrangement. Where a Member accords recognition
autonomously, it shall afford adequate opportunity for any
other Member to demonstrate that such circumstances exist.
(c) Where a Member is contemplating according recognition to
prudential measures of any other country, paragraph 4(b) of
Article VII shall not apply.

4. Dispute Settlem ent
Panels for disputes on prudential issues and other financial
matters shall have the necessary expertise relevant to the
specific financial service under dispute.

5. Definitions
For the purposes of this Annex:
(a) A financial service is any service of a financial nature
offered by a financial service supplier of a Member. Financial
services include all insurance and insurance-related services,
and all banking and other financial services (excluding
insurance) . Financial services include the following activities:

In su ra n c e a n d in s u ra n c e -re la te d se rv ic e s
(i) Direct insurance (including co-insurance) :
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(A) life
(B) non-life
(ii) Reinsurance and retrocession;
(iii) Insurance intermediation, such as brokerage and agency;
(iv) Services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy,
actuarial, risk assessment and claim settlement services.

B an k in g a n d o th e r fin a n c ia l s e rv ic e s (e x c lu d in g in s u ra n c e )
(v) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the
public;
(vi) Lending of all types, including consumer credit, mortgage
credit, factoring and financing of commercial transaction;
(vii) Financial leasing;
(viii) All payment and money transmission services, including
credit, charge and debit cards, travellers cheques and bankers
drafts;
(ix) Guarantees and commitments;
(x) Trading for own account or for account of customers,
whether on an exchange, in an over-the-counter market or
otherwise, the following:
(A) money market instruments (including cheques, bills,
certificates of deposits) ;
(B) foreign exchange;
(C) derivative products including, but not limited to, futures
and options;
(D) exchange rate and interest rate instruments, including
products such as swaps, forward rate agreements;
(E) transferable securities;
(F) other negotiable instruments and financial assets, including
bullion.
(xi) Participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including
underwriting and placement as agent (whether publicly or
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privately) and provision of services related to such issues;
(xii) Money broking;
(xiii) Asset management, such as cash or portfolio management,
all forms of collective investment management, pension fund
management, custodial, depository and trust services;
(xiv) Settlement and clearing services for financial assets,
including securities, derivative products, and other negotiable
instruments;
(XV) Provision and transfer o f financial information, and
financial data processing and related softv^are by suppliers of
other financial services;

(xvi) Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial
services on all the activities listed in subparagraphs (v) through
(XV ) , including credit reference and analysis, investment and
portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisitions and on
corporate restructuring and strategy.
(b) A financial service supplier means any natural or juridical
person of a Member wishing to supply or supplying financial
services but the term "financial service supplier" does not
include a public entity.
(c) "Public entity” means:
(i) a government, a central bank or a monetary authority, of a
Member, or an entity owned or controlled by a Member, that is
principally engaged in carrying out governmental functions or
activities for governmental purposes, not including an entity
principally engaged in supplying financial services on
commercial terms; or
(ii) a private entity, performing functions normally performed
by a central bank or monetary authority, when exercising those
functions.

Second annex on Financial Services Back to top
1. Notwithstanding Article II of the Agreement and paragraphs 1
and 2 of the Annex on Article II Exemptions, a Member may,
during a period of 60 days beginning four months a fte r the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, list in that Annex
measures relating to financial services which are inconsistent
with paragraph 1 of Article II of the Agreement.
2. Notwithstanding Article XXI of the Agreement, a Member
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may, during a period of 60 days beginning four months after the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, improve,
modify or withdraw all or part of the specific commitments on
financial services inscribed in its Schedule.
3. The Council for Trade in Services shall establish any
procedures necessary for the application of paragraphs 1 and 2.
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Appendix C
Canadian Schedule o f Commitments Under NAFTA

Sector:

A boriginal Affairs

Sub-Sector:
In d u strial Classification:
Type of R eservation:

N ational Treatment (A rticles 1102, 1202)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (A rticles 1103, 1203)
L ocal Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (A rticle 1106)
Senior M anagem ent and Boards o f Directors (Article 1107)

Description:

Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure denying investors o f
another Party and their investm ents, or service providers o f another Party, any
rights or preferences provided to aboriginal peoples.

Existing M easures:

Sector:

C onstitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B o f the Canada A ct 1982 (U .K .), 1982,
c. 11
A ll Sectors

Sub-Sector:
Industrial Classification:
Type of Reservation:

N ational Treatment (Article 1102)

Description:

Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to residency
requirements for the ownership by investors o f another Party, or their
investm ents, o f oceanffont land.

Existing M easures:

C onstitution A ct, 1982, being Schedule B o f the Canada Act 1982 (U .K .), 1982,
c .ll

Sector:

Com m unications

Sub-Sector:

T elecom m unications Transport N etw orks and Services, Radiocomm unications
and Submarine Cables

Industrial Classification: CPC 752 - T elecom m unications Services
CPC 7543 - C onnection Services
CPC 7549 - Other Telecom m unications Services N ot Elsewhere Classified
(lim ited to telecom m unications transport networks and services)

Type of Reservation:

N ational Treatment (Article 1102)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1103)
Senior M anagem ent and Boards o f Directors (Article 1107)

Description:

Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to
investment in telecom m unications transport networks and telecom m unications
transport services, radiocom m unications and submarine cables, including
ownership restrictions and measures concerning corporate officers and directors
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and place o f incorporation.
This reservation does not apply to providers o f enhanced or value-added
services w hose underlying telecom m unications transmission facilities are leased
from providers o f public telecom m unications transport networks.

Existing M easures:

B ell C anada A ct, S.C. 1987, c. 19
B ritish C olum bia Telephone C om pany S pecial A ct, S.C. 1916, c. 66
T eleglobe C anada R eorganization a n d D ivestitu re A ct, S.C. 1987, c. 12
T elesat C anada R eorganization a n d D ivestitu re A ct, S.C 1991, c. 52
R adiocom m unication A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2
Telegraphs A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-5
Telecom m unications P o lic y F ram ew ork, 1987

Sector:

Com m unications

Sub-Sector:

Telecom m unications Transport N etworks and Services, Radiocomm unications
and Submarine Cables

Industry Classification: CPC 752 - Telecom m unications Services (not including enhanced or value-added
services)
CPC 7543 - C onnection Services
CPC 7549 - Other Telecom m unications Services N ot Elsewhere Classified
(lim ited to telecom m unications transport networks and services)

Type of Reservation:

N ational Treatment (A rticle 1202)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)

Description:

Cross-Border Services
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to
radiocom m unications, submarine cables and the provision o f telecom munications
transport networks and telecom m unications transport services. These measures
m ay apply to such matters as market entry, spectrum assignm ent, tariffs,
intercarrier agreements, terms and conditions o f service, interconnection betw een
networks and services, and routing requirements that impede the provision on a
cross-border basis o f telecom m unications transport networks and
telecom m unications transport services, radiocom m unications and submarine
cables.
Telecom m unications transport services typically involve the real-time
transmission o f custom er-supplied information betw een two or more points
without any end-to-end change in the form or content o f the customer's
information, w hether or not such services are offered to the public generally.
These services include voice and data services by wire, radiocommunications or
any other electrom agnetic m eans o f transmission.
This reservation does not apply to measures relating to the cross-border provision
o f enhanced or value-added services.

Existing M easures:

B ell Canada A ct, S.C. 1987, c. 19
British C olum bia Telephone C om pany S p ecia l A ct, S.C. 1916. c. 66R ailw ay Act.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. R-3
R adiocom m unication A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. K -2T elegraphs A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. T5
Telecom m unications P o licy F ram ew ork, 1987
T elecom m unications D ecisions, C.R.T.C., including (85-19), (90-3), (91-10), (9121 ), (92-11) and (92-12)

Sector:

Governm ent Finance

Sub-Sector:

Securities

Industry Classification: SIC 8152 - Finance and E conom ic Administration
Type of Reservation:

National Treatment (Article 1102)

Description:

Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to the
acquisition, sale or other disposition b y nationals o f another Party o f bonds,
treasury b ills or other kinds o f debt securities issued by the Government o f
Canada, a province or local government.

Existing M easures:

F inancial A dm inistration A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. F -1 1

Sector:

M inority Affairs

Sub-Sector:
Industrial Classification:
Type o f Reservation:

National Treatment (A rticles 1102, 1202)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Senior M anagement and Boards o f Directors (Article 1107)

Description:

Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure according rights or
preferences to socially or econom ically disadvantaged minorities.

Existing M easures:

Sector:

Social Services

Sub-Sector;
Industrial Classification:
Type of Reservation:

National Treatment (A rticles 1102, 1202)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Senior M anagem ent and Boards o f Directors (Article 1107)

Description:

Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure with respect to the
provision o f public law enforcem ent and correctional services, and the
follow ing services to the extent that they are social services established or
maintained for a public purpose: incom e security or insurance, social security or
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insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child
care.

Existing M easures:
Sector:

Transportation

Sub-Sector:

Air Transportation

In dustry Classification: SIC 4513 - N on-Scheduled A ir Transport, Specialty, Industry
Type of Reservation:

N ational Treatment (Article 1 102)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1103)
Senior M anagement and Boards o f Directors (Article 1 107)

Description:

Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that restricts the
acquisition or establishment o f an investm ent in Canada for the provision o f
specialty air services to a Canadian national or a corporation incorporated and
having its principal place o f business in Canada, its c h ie f executive officer and
not few er than two-thirds o f its directors as Canadian nationals, and not less than
75 percent o f its voting interest ow ned and controlled by persons otherwise
m eeting these requirements.

Existing M easures:

A eronau tics A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2
A ir R egulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 2
A ircraft M arkin g a n d R egistration R egulations, SO R /90-59

Sector:

Transportation

Sub-Sector:

Water Transportation

Industrial Classification: SIC 4 1 2 9 - Other H eavy Construction (lim ited to dredging)
SIC 4541 - Freight and Passenger Water Transport Industry
SIC 4542 - Ferry Industry
SIC 4543 - Marine T ow ing Industry
SIC 4 5 4 9 - Other Water Transport Industries
SIC 4552 - Harbour and Port Operation Industries (lim ited to berthing,
bunkering and other vessel operations in a port)
SIC 4553 - Marine Salvage Industry
SIC 4 5 5 4 - Piloting Service, Water Transport Industry
SIC 4 5 5 9 - Other Service Industries Incidental to Water Transport (not
including landside aspects o f port activities)

Type of Reservation:

N ational Treatment (A rticles 1 102, 1202)
M ost-Favored-N ation Treatment (A rticles 1 103, 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Senior M anagem ent and Boards o f Directors (Article 1107)

Description:

Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to
investm ent in or provision o f maritime cabotage services, including;
(a) the transportation o f goods or passengers by vessel betw'cen points in the
territory o f Canada and in its E xclusive Econom ic Zone;
(b) with respect to waters above the continental shelf, the transportation o f
goods or passengers in relation to the exploration, exploitation or transportation
o f the mineralor non-living namral resources o f the continental shelf; and
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(c) the engaging by vessel in any maritime activity o f a commercial nature in
the territory o f Canada and in its E xclusive Econom ic Zone and, with respect to
waters above the continental shelf, in such other maritime activities o f a
com m ercial nature in relation to the exploration, exploitation or transportation
o f mineral or non-living natural resources o f the continental shelf.
This reservation relates to, am ong other things, local presence requirements for
service providers entitled to participate in these activities, criteria for the
issuance o f a temporary cabotage license to foreign vessels and limits on the
number o f cabotage licenses issued to foreign vessels.

Existing M easures:

C oastin g Trade Act, S.C. 1992, c. 31
C anada Shipping A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9
C ustom s A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.)
C ustom s a n d E xcise O ffshore A pplication A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-53

Sector:

Transportation

Sub-Sector:

W ater Transportation

In dustry Classification: SIC 4541 - Freight and Passenger Water Transport Industry
SIC
SIC
SIC
SIC
SIC
SIC
SIC
SIC

Type of Reservation:

Description:

4542
4543
4549
4551
4552
4553
4554
4559

-

Ferry Industry
Marine T ow ing Industry
Other Water Transport Industries
Marine Cargo Handling Industry
Harbour and Port Operation Industries
Marine Salvage Industry
Piloting Service, Water Transport Industry
Other Service Industries Incidental to Water Transport

N ational Treatment (A rticles 1102, 1202)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Articles 1103, 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Senior M anagement and Boards o f Directors (Article 1107)
Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure denying service
providers or investors o f the United States, or their investments, the benefits
accorded service providers or investors o f M exico or any other country, or their
investm ents, in sectors or activities equivalent to those subject to Schedule o f the
United States, A nnex II, page lI-U -9.

Existing M easures:
Sector:

Transportation

Sub-Sector:

Water Transportation

Industry Classification: SIC 4541 - Freight and Passenger Water Transport Industry
SIC 4542
SIC 4543
SIC 4 5 4 9
SIC 4551
SIC 4552
SIC 4553
SIC 4 5 5 4
SIC 4559

-

Ferry Industry
Marine T ow ing Industry
Other Water Transport Industries
Marine Cargo Handling Industry
Harbour and Port Operation Industries
Marine Salvage Industry
Piloting Service, Water Transport Industry
Other Service Industries Incidental to Water Transport
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Type of Reservation:

M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1203)

D escription:

Cross-Border Services
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to the
im plementation o f agreements, arrangements and other formal or informal
undertakings with other countries with respect to maritime activities in waters o f
mutual interest in such areas as pollution control (including double hull
requirements for oil tankers), safe navigation, barge inspection standards, water
quality, pilotage, salvage, drug abuse control and maritime communications.

Existing M easures:

U nited S tates W reckers Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-3
Various agreem ents a n d arrangem ents, including:
(a) M em orandum o f A rrangem ents on G reat Lakes Pilotage;
(b) C anada - U nited States Joint M arine P ollution Contingency Plan;
(c) A greem en t with the U nited States on Loran "C" Service on the East an d West
C oasts; a n d
(d) D enm ark - C anada Join t M arine P ollution C ircum polar Agreement.
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Appendix D

Canadian Schedule of Commitments Under the GATS- Financial Services Sector
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
GATS/SC/I 6/Suppi.4/Rev. 1
6 June 2000
(00-2236)
Council for Trade in Services
CANADA
Schedule of Specific Commitments
Supplement 4
Revision
(This is authentic in English and French only)

Revision o f the Canadian Schedule o f Commitments for GATS - Financial Services
Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial
presence 4) Presence o f natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector
Limitations on Market Access
Limitations on National Treatment
Additional Commitments
7. FINANCIAL SERVICES
Measures applicable to all Sectors in Financial Services
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1. Commitments in this Chapter are undertaken in accordance with the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services ("Understanding").
2. For greater certainty, market access commitments with respect to the "cross-border"
and "consumption abroad" supply o f services (as described in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) o f
Article 1 o f the General Agreement on Trade in Services) apply only to the transactions
indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4 o f Market Access o f the Understanding. It is understood
that paragraph 4 of that section o f the Understanding does not impose any obligation to
allow non-resident financial services suppliers to solicit business.
3. The commitments on "commercial presence" are bound according to the
Understanding.
4. The commitments on "presence o f natural persons" are scheduled in accordance with
the Understanding and bound according to the general limitations applicable to all sectors
in this schedule (Part I).
5. Otherwise, the commitments in this Chapter are subject to the general conditions or
limitations applicable to all sectors in this schedule.
(1), (2) None
(1), (2) None, other than:
(i) Certain supplies between members o f a closely-related group o f corporations which
includes a financial institution may be treated as exempt supplies under value-added
taxes. Imported supplies do not qualify for this treatment.
(ii) Supplies between resident and non-resident branches or representative offices o f a
financial institution are treated as supplies between separate persons for the purposes of
value-added taxes.
(3) None, other than:
Federally-regulated financial institutions having capital in excess of $750 million are
required, within five years o f having reached the threshold, to have 35 per cent of their
voting shares widely-held and listed and posted for trading on a Canadian Stock
Exchange.
(3) None, other than:
(i) Certain supplies between members o f a closely-related group o f corporations which
includes a financial institution may be treated as exempt supplies under value-added
taxes. Imported supplies do not qualify for this treatment.
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Foreign-owned federally regulated institutions (i.e. insurance, banks and trust and loan):
A controlling number o f shares o f a Canadian subsidiary must be held directly by the
foreign company incorporated in the jurisdiction where the foreign company, either
directly or through a subsidiary, principally carries on business.
(ii) Supplies between resident and non-resident branches or representative offices o f a
financial institution are treated as supplies between separate persons for the purposes of
value-added taxes.
Federally regulated institutions (i.e. insurance, banks and trust and loan): A minimum of
one half o f directors must be either Canadian citizens ordinarily resident in Canada or
permanent residents ordinarily resident in Canada.
The Government o f Ontario Management Board Directive and Industrial Development
Review Process provides for a price preference o f up to 10 per cent for Canadian content
based on value-added in Canada for certain government purchases. The Management
Board Directive applies on the basis o f the nationality o f the individual service provider.
(4) See paragraph 4 o f headnote on Financial Services.
(4) See paragraph 4 o f headnote on Financial Services.
A. Insurance and Insurance-Related Services
(CPC 812*+ 814)
(a) Life, accident and health insurance services (CPC 8121)
(1) None, other than:
Direct insurance (federal): Services must be supplied through a commercial presence
with the exception o f marine insurance.
(1) None
(b) Non-life insurance services (except deposit insurance and similar compensation
schemes) (CPC 8129)
(All provinces); Services must be supplied through a commercial presence.
(c) Reinsurance and retrocession (CPC 81299*)
Reinsurance and retrocession (federal): Services must be supplied through a commercial
presence.

114
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(All provinces, excluding Alberta and New Brunswick): Services must be supplied
through a commercial presence.
(2) None, other than:
Reinsurance and retrocession (federal, Alberta and Newfoundland): The purchase of
reinsurance services by a Canadian insurer, other than a life insurer or a reinsurer, from a
non-resident reinsurer is limited to no more than 25 per cent o f the risks undertaken by
the insurer purchasing the reinsurance.
(2) None, other than:
Direct insurance other than life, personal accident, sickness or marine insurance (federal):
An excise tax of 10 per cent is applicable on net premiums paid to non-resident insurers
or exchanges in regard to a contract against a risk ordinarily within Canada, unless such
insurance is deemed not to be available in Canada.
Direct insurance (Alberta): A fee payable to the province o f 50 per cent of the premium
paid and regulatory notification are required on insurance o f risks in the province by
unlicensed insurers.
(Saskatchewan): A fee payable to the province o f 10 per cent o f the premium is required
on insurance of risks in the province by unlicensed insurers.
(3) None, other than:
Direct insurance and reinsurance and retrocession (federal): The solicitation of insurance
services in Canada can only be effected through:
(i) a corporation incorporated under federal or provincial laws;
(ii) a corporation incorporated by or under the laws o f another jurisdiction outside
Canada (i.e., a branch of a foreign corporation);
(iii) an association formed on the plan known as Lloyds; and
(iv) reciprocal insurance exchanges.
(3) None, other than:
Direct insurance and reinsurance and retrocession (Ontario): Capital requirements for
mutual insurance companies do not apply to certain mutual insurance companies
incorporated in Ontario.
(Quebec): Three quarters o f directors must be Canadian citizens and a majority must
reside in Quebec.
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A branch o f a foreign insurance company must be established directly under the foreign
insurance company incorporated in the jurisdiction where the foreign insurance company,
either directly or through a subsidiary, principally carries on business.
(All provinces): Insurance activities can only be provided through:
(i) a corporation incorporated under provincial statutes;
(ii) an extra-provincial insurance corporation, i.e., an insurer incorporated by, or under
the laws o f another jurisdiction (including a federally-authorized branch of a foreign
corporation);
(iii) an association formed on the plan known as Lloyds;
(iv) (excluding Quebec and Prince Edward Island): Reciprocal insurance exchanges.
(Quebec): Every insurer not incorporated under an Act o f Quebec has, in respect of the
activities it carries on in Quebec, the rights and obligations of an insurance company or
mutual association incorporated under Acts o f Quebec as the case may be. It can also
exercise additional activities provided for in the law. However, the activities of such
corporation will be limited to those allowed under its constituting legislation.
(Alberta and Prince Edward Island): Subsidiaries of foreign insurance corporations must
be federally authorized.
(Quebec): Non-residents can not acquire, without ministerial approval, either directly or
indirectly, more than 30 per cent o f the voting rights attached to shares o f a Quebecchartered insurance company or of its controlling entity.
(Quebec): Upon any allotment or transfer o f voting shares of the capital stock insurance
company "SSQ, Société d'assurance-vie inc" or o f the holding company "Groupe SSQ
inc", the minister may ask such companies to prove that the shares were offered by
preference to Quebec residents and subsequently to other Canadian residents, but that no
offer was made or was acceptable.
(Federal): The purchase o f reinsurance services by a Canadian insurer, other than a life
insurer or reinsurer, from a resident reinsurer is limited to no more than 75 per cent o f the
risks undertaken by the insurer purchasing the reinsurance.
(British Columbia): Incorporation, share acquisition or application for business
authorization, where any person controls or will control 10 per cent or more of the votes
o f the company, is subject to ministerial approval.
Motor vehicle insurance (Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia):
Motor vehicle insurance is provided by public monopoly.
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(4) See paragraph 4 o f headnote on Financial Services.
(4) See paragraph 4 o f headnote on Financial Services.
(d) Services auxiliary to insurance (including broking and agency services) (CPC 8140)
(1) None, other than:
Intermediation of insurance relating to maritime shipping, commercial aviation, space
launching, freight (including satellites) and goods in international transit (all provinces):
Services must be supplied through a commercial presence in the province in which the
service is provided.
(1) None, other than:
(Saskatchewan): Fire or hail insurance contracts have to be signed or countersigned by a
licensed agent who resides in the province. Where there is disagreement concerning hail
insurance, such damages are to be estimated by an appraiser who is a taxpayer of the
province.
(Ontario and Prince Edward Island): Non-resident individual adjusters are prohibited
from being adjusters in the province.
(Manitoba): Licenses to act as insurance agents and brokers are not issued to non
residents o f Canada.
(New Brunswick): Licenses shall not be issued to a corporation whose head office is
outside Canada.
(Alberta and Manitoba): A license to act as a special broker authorized to place insurance
coverage with unlicensed insurers is restricted to residents o f the province, as the case
may be.
(British Columbia): Licenses for general insurance shall be issued only to residents of the
province.
(Prince Edward Island): Licenses to act as insurance agent or adjusters are not issued to
non-resident o f the province.
(2) None
(2) None, other than:
Intermediation o f insurance relating to commercial aviation, space launching, freight
(including satellites) and goods in international transit (federal): An excise tax of 10 per
cent is applicable on net premiums paid to non-resident insurers or exchanges in regard to
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a contract against a risk ordinarily within Canada, unless such insurance is deemed not to
be available in Canada. The excise tax is also applicable on net premiums payable with
regard to a contract entered into, through a non-resident broker or agent, with any insurer
authorized under the laws o f Canada or o f any province to carry out the business of
insurance.
(3) None, other than:
(New Brunswick): Licenses shall not be issued to a corporation whose head office is
outside Canada.
(Ontario and Prince Edward Island): Non-resident individual adjusters are prohibited
from being adjusters in the province.
(3) None, other than:
(Saskatchewan): Fire or hail insurance contracts have to be signed or countersigned by a
licensed agent who resides in the province. Where there is disagreement concerning hail
insurance, such damages are to be estimated by an appraiser who is a taxpayer o f the
province.
(Ontario): No licence is provided to a corporation to act as an insurance broker, agency or
adjuster if the majority o f the voting rights are in shares owned by non-residents. A
corporate agency or adjuster or insurance broker which is majority non-resident-owned
and licensed as a result o f grand-fathering cannot expand through purchase of assets or
business or merger or amalgamation with any other broker, agent or adjuster. No licence
is provided to a corporation or partnership which is an insurance agency or adjuster if the
head office is outside Canada or if any partner is resident outside Canada.
(Manitoba): Licenses to act as insurance agents and brokers are not issued to non
residents o f Canada.
(Alberta and Manitoba): A license to act as a special broker authorized to place insurance
coverage with unlicensed insurers is restricted to residents of the province, as the case
may be.
(British Columbia): Licenses for general insurance shall be issued only to residents o f the
province.
(Prince Edward Island): Licenses to act as insurance agent or adjusters are not issued to
non-resident of the province.
(4) See paragraph 4 o f headnote on Financial Services.
(4) See paragraph 4 of headnote on Financial Services.
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B. Banking and Other Financial Services
(excl. insurance)
(1) None
(2) None
(3) None, other than:
(1) None
(2) None
(3) None, other than;
(a) Acceptance o f deposits and other repayable funds from the public (CPC 8111581119)
Banks: To undertake the business of banking in Canada, a foreign bank must:
(i) incorporate a bank subsidiary under the Bank Act; or
(b) Lending of all types, including inter alia, consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring
and financing of commercial transactions (CPC 8113)
(ii) establish a bank branch under the Bank Act,
In order to establish a bank branch, a foreign bank must be authorised under the Bank Act
and must be incorporated by or under the laws o f another jurisdiction outside Canada
(i.e., an authorised foreign bank).
(c) Financial leasing (CPC 8112)
A bank branch must be established directly under the authorised foreign bank
incorporated in the jurisdiction where the authorised foreign bank principally carries on
business.
An authorised foreign bank can establish only one of two types o f bank branches:
(i) a full service bank branch (i.e., a Schedule III, Part 1, authorised foreign bank); or,
(ii) lending bank branch (i.e., a Schedule III, Part 2, authorised foreign bank).
Full service bank branches and lending bank branches cannot engage in the activities in
which a specialised financing corporation, as defined in the Bank Act, may engage.
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Full service bank branches and lending bank branches cannot be member institutions o f
the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation.
A full service bank branch can only accept deposits in amounts less than $150,000 and
payable in Canada if the sum o f all deposits below $150,000 amounts to less than one
percent o f total deposits payable in Canada.
A lending bank branch can only accept deposits or otherwise borrow money by means o f
financial instruments from, or guarantee any securities or accept any bills of exchanges
that cannot be subsequently sold to or traded with:
(i) financial institutions, other than a foreign bank; or,
(ii) a foreign bank whose principal activity is the provision of services that would be
permitted by the Bank Act if they were provided by a bank in Canada; and, that is
regulated as a bank in the country under whose laws it was incorporated or in any country
in which it carries on business.
A lending bank branch cannot be a member o f the Canadian Payments Association.
An authorised foreign bank cannot establish a lending bank branch in conjunction with a
full service bank branch, a bank subsidiary, a loan company, or a trust company that
accepts deposits.
No one person (Canadian or foreign) may own more than 10 per cent o f any class of
shares o f a Schedule 1 bank
(d) All payment and money transmission services
(CPC 81339*)
Trust and loan companies (federal
and all provinces, excluding British Colombia): Federal or provincial incorporation is
required.
Trust and loan companies
(Alberta): At least three quarters o f the directors must be ordinarily resident in Canada.
(e) Guarantees and commitments (CPC 81199*)
(Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba):
The direct or indirect acquisition of Canadian-controlled companies by non-residents is
restricted to 10 per cent individually and 25 per cent collectively.

120
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(Saskatchewan): Individual and collective foreign ownership o f Canadian-controlled and
provincially incorporated companies can be no more than 10 per cent o f shares
(British Columbia): Incorporations, share acquisition or application for business
authorization, where any person controls or will control 10 per cent or more o f the votes
o f the company, are subject to ministerial approval.
(New Brunswick): At least two o f the directors must be resident in new Brunswick.
(Nova Scotia): A majority o f directors must be resident in Canada and at least two
resident in Nova Scotia.
(Manitoba and Ontario): Foreign persons may not exercise the voting rights attached to
shares if they are not registered as shareholders in respect o f the shares.
(Manitoba): Majority of directors must be resident in Canada.
(Quebec): Three quarters o f the directors must be Canadian citizens and a majority must
reside in Quebec.
(Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia): Incorporation or registration will be refused
unless authorities are satisfied that there exists a public benefit and advantage for an
additional corporation.
(Ontario): Consent to change in control or transfers of 10 per cent or more o f voting
shares may be refused if it would be in the public interest to do so.
Credit unions, caisses populaires and associations or groups thereof (all provinces): Must
incorporate in the jurisdictions in which they operate.
Credit unions and caisses populaires (Ontario): Directors of credit unions must be
Canadian citizens or permanent resident.
(British Columbia): Directors and subscribers of credit unions must be residents of the
province
Mortgage brokers (Ontario); Must incorporate under the laws o f Canada, Ontario or o f
another province. Ownership o f a corporation by foreign persons must not exceed 10 per
cent individually and 25 per cent collectively of the total number of equity shares.
(All provinces except British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec): Credit unions and caisses
populaires are exempt from the corporate capital tax.
(Nova Scotia): Must incorporate under the laws o f Canada or Nova Scotia.
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(Alberta): Directors o f credit unions must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents of
Canada and three quarters must at all times be ordinarily resident in the province.
(Saskatchewan): Must maintain a business office in the province.
(Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan): Directors o f credit unions must be Canadian
citizens
(Quebec): Founding members o f caisses populaires must have a residence, place of
business or employment in the territory mentioned in the caisse's statutes.
Community bonds corporations (Manitoba, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan):
Directors o f Community Bonds corporations must be resident o f the province.
Loan and investment companies (Quebec): Federal or provincial incorporation.
Co-operative corporations (Newfoundland and Ontario): Must incorporate under the law
o f the applicable province or under federal law.
Venture capital corporations (federal and all provinces): Measures that result in a
different tax treatment with respect to an investment in a venture capital corporation as
prescribed pursuant to the Income Tax Act of Canada and provincial laws.
Lending o f all types (Nova Scotia): Must incorporate under the laws o f Canada or Nova
Scotia.
Acceptance o f deposits (Quebec): The acceptance o f deposits o f public and para-public
institutions is provided by a public monopoly.
(4) See paragraph 4 o f the headnote on Financial Services, and:
Mortgage brokers (Ontario): Must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada
and ordinarily resident in Canada.
(Nova Scotia): Must be resident in the province.
(4) See paragraph 4 o f the headnote on Financial Services, and:
(f) Trading for own account or for account of customers whether on an exchange, in an
over-the-counter market or otherwise, the following:
- money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificate of deposits, etc.) (CPC 81339*);
- foreign exchange
(CPC 81333*);
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(1) None, other than:
Advisory and auxiliary financial services (Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia,
Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan): Services must be supplied through a commercial
presence in the jurisdiction in which the adviser is providing advice.
Asset management (Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec and
Saskatchewan): Services must be supplied through a commercial presence in the
jurisdiction in which the service is provided.
(1) None
- derivative products including but not limited to, futures and options (CPC 8 1339*)
(Quebec): The management o f pension funds of public and para-public institutions in
Quebec is provided by public monopoly.
Custodial services (All provinces): Mutual funds which offer securities in Canada must
use a resident custodian. A non-resident sub-custodian may be used if it has shareholders
equity of at least $100 million.
- exchange rate and interest rate instruments, including products such as swaps, forward
rate agreements, etc. (CPC 81339*)
(2) None, other than:
Trading in securities and commodity futures - persons (all provinces): There is a
requirement to register in order to trade through dealers and brokers that are neither
resident nor registered in the province in which the trade is effected.
(2) None
- transferable securities
(CPC 81321*)
- other negotiable instruments and financial assets, including bullion
(CPC 81339*)
(3) None, other than:
Securities dealers and brokers (British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Yukon): Must
be incorporated, formed or continued under federal, provincial or territorial laws
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(Quebec): Only brokerage firms incorporated under federal, provincial or territorial laws
may be members o f the Montreal Exchange.
(3) None, other than:
Trading in securities and commodity futures and advisory and auxiliary financial services
- dealers, brokers, and advisers: (Alberto, Ontario, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan): A director or officer o f an applicant firm must have been a
resident o f Canada for a period of at least one year prior to the application.
Advisory and auxiliary financial services and Asset Management (Nova Scotia and
Quebec): The establishment must be managed by a resident o f the province.
Custodial services (All provinces): Mutual funds which offer securities in Canada must
use a resident custodian. A non-resident sub-custodian may be used if it has shareholders
equity o f at least $100 million
(Quebec): The responsibility for opening up accounts is to be managed by a Quebec
resident.
(g) Participation in issues o f all kinds o f securities, including underwriting and placement
as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of service related to such issues
(CPC 8132)
Advisory and auxiliary financial services (British Colombia): Must be incorporated,
formed or continued under federal, provincial or territorial laws.
Asset management (Quebec): The management o f pension funds o f public and parapublic institutions in Quebec is provided by a public monopoly.</PThe file is too large
for this option. Only the first 30000 characters will be displayed
(h) Money broking (CPC 81339*)
(4) See paragraph 4 o f the headnote on Financial services, and
(4) See paragraph 4 o f the headnote on Financial services, and:
(i) Asset management, such as cash or portfolio management, all forms of collective
investment management, custodial, depository and trust services (CPC 8119*, 81323*).
(Quebec): Only Canadian residents may be individual members of the Montreal
exchange.
Trading in securities and commodity futures and advisory and auxiliary financial services
- dealers, brokers and advisers: (all provinces except British Columbia, New Brunswick
and Quebec): An individual applicant for registration is required to have been a resident
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o f Canada for a period o f at least one year prior to the application and a resident o f the
province in which he/she wishes to operate at the date o f application.
(j) Settlement and clearing services for financial assets, inch securities, derivative
products, and other negotiable instruments (CPC 81339*, 81319)
(Quebec); An individual acting as a representative o f a dealer or adviser, subject to
certain exemptions, must be a resident o f the province
(k) Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services on all the activities
listed in Article 5(a)(v) through (xv) o f the Annex on Financial Services, inch credit
reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice, advice on
acquisitions and on corporate restructuring and strategy (CPC 8131*, 8133*)
(1) Provision and transfer o f financial information, and financial data processing and
related software by providers o f other financial services (CPC 8131*, 842*, 843*, 844*)
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Trade in Services
CANADA
List o f Article II (MFN) Exemptions
Supplement 2
(This is authentic in English and French only)

This text replaces the Financial Services section contained in pages 2 and 3 o f document
GATS/EL/16.
CANADA - LIST OF ARTICLE II (MFN) EXEMPTIONS
Modes o f supply; (1) Cross-border supply (2) Consumption abroad (3) Commercial
presence (4) Presence o f natural persons
Sector or subsector
Description of measure
indicating its inconsistency
with Article II
Countries to which the measure applies
Intended duration
Conditions creating the need for the exemption
Insurance
Intermediation:
Agency Services
Financial Services, including lending o f all types and trading for own account of certain
securities by loan and investment companies.
Preferential access to the Ontario insurance services market is provided to non-resident
individual US insurance agents.
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Preferential treatment in Quebec for allocation o f licences is provided by the Province of
Quebec to loan and investment companies incorporated under the laws o f the Parliament
o f the United Kingdom and Ireland for purposes o f obtaining a licence to carry on
business.
All states in the United States
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Republic o f Ireland
Indeterminate
Indeterminate
Reciprocity
Maintenance o f existing historical preference
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